The Hatch Act Modernization Act: Putting the Government Back in Politics by Azzaro, Shannon D
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 42
Number 3 Colloquium - Financing and Fairness:
Implementation and Equity in the Urban Charter
School
Article 6
April 2016
The Hatch Act Modernization Act: Putting the
Government Back in Politics
Shannon D. Azzaro
Fordham University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Election Law Commons, Law and Politics Commons, and the Legislation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Shannon D. Azzaro, The Hatch Act Modernization Act: Putting the Government Back in Politics, 42 Fordham Urb. L.J. 781 (2015).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol42/iss3/6
  
  781
THE HATCH ACT MODERNIZATION ACT: 
PUTTING THE GOVERNMENT BACK IN 
POLITICS 
Shannon D. Azzaro* 
Introduction ............................................................................................. 782 
  I.  Federal Regulation of the Political Activities of Government 
Employees ......................................................................................... 787 
A. The Pendleton Act of 1883 .................................................. 788 
B. The Hatch Act’s Prohibitions and Procedures .................. 790 
1. Effects on Federal Employees ....................................... 792 
2. Effects on State Employees ........................................... 794 
C. Constitutional Challenges to the Hatch Act’s 
Prohibitions ............................................................................ 798 
D. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 .... 802 
E. Hatch Act Amendment Attempts: 1976, 1977, 1988, 
and 1990.................................................................................. 802 
F. The Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 1993 .................. 805 
G. The Hatch Act Modernization Act of 2012 ....................... 807 
1. Effects of HAMA on Federal Employees .................... 808 
2. Effects of HAMA on State Employees ........................ 808 
H. “Little Hatch Acts” ............................................................... 810 
1. Comparing Different “Little Hatch Acts” ................... 811 
2. The Constitutionality of “Little Hatch Acts” .............. 815 
  II.  Post-HAMA, Rigid, Inflexible Results Remain Due to the 
Hatch Act’s Disparate Application and Lack of Guidance ......... 817 
A. Confusion Over Applicable Regulations Deters 
Political Participation ........................................................... 817 
1. Disparate State Regulations. ......................................... 818 
2. Overlapping Prohibitions: The Uniform Code of 
Military Justice ................................................................ 819 
																																																																																																																																
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2015; B.A., The Pennsylvania 
State University, 2012.  I would like to thank my family and friends for their patience 
and invaluable support.  I am also grateful to Professor Abner Greene for his 
guidance during the early development of this Note. 
782 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLII 
B. Lack of Guidance for Bi- and Multi-State Agencies 
Results in Broad Prohibitions .............................................. 821 
C. Rigid Employee Penalty Provisions Produce 
Undesirable Results .............................................................. 827 
D. Criticisms that HAMA Remains Unduly Restrictive 
on Some Law Enforcement Officers .................................. 828 
  III.  Eliminating Confusion and Unifying Disparate Prohibitions 
to Foster Healthy Political Discourse ............................................. 830 
A. States Must Provide Guidance to Overcome Wide 
Disparities in Hatch Act Enforcement ............................... 831 
B. Exempting all Lower-Level Employees from the 
Hatch Act’s Prohibitions ...................................................... 832 
C. Adding a Discretionary Penalty Provision ......................... 834 
D. Adding a Statute of Limitations .......................................... 836 
E. Taking Realistic Steps Toward the Realization of 
Greater Predictability and Enforcement of the Hatch 
Act .......................................................................................... 837 
Conclusion ................................................................................................ 838 
 
[H]ere in our own country, millions of our own citizens have been 
denied one of the most basic democratic rights, the right to 
participate in the political process, because of conditions that 
haven’t existed for a very long time. . . . The conditions which once 
gave rise to the Hatch Act as it was before this reform bill passed are 
no longer present, and they cannot justify the continued muzzling of 
millions of American citizens.1 
    – President William J. Clinton 
INTRODUCTION 
The Hatch Act of 1939 (the “Hatch Act,” or the “Act”), officially 
named An Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities, enacted 
sweeping prohibitions against certain types of political participation 
by federal, and later state and local, government employees.2  The 
Hatch Act regulates the permissible political activities of government 
employees.3  The Act was enacted to achieve four primary goals: (1) 
																																																																																																																																
 1. President’s Remarks on Signing the Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 1993, 
2 PUB. PAPERS 1694, 1695 (Oct. 6, 1993). 
 2. Act of July 19, 1940, ch. 640, Pub. L. No. 76-753, 54 Stat. 767.  The Hatch Act 
prohibited activities such as taking any active part in political campaigns, running for 
partisan political office, using official authority or influence to interfere with an 
election, or soliciting political contributions, etc. Id. 
 3. 5 U.S.C. § 7324 (2012). 
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to ensure the political neutrality of government workers by barring 
partisan political activity by government employees; (2) to prevent 
partisan elected officials from using government employees for their 
own political purposes; (3) to prevent the public employees’ loyalty 
from going to a single party or public official; and (4) to insulate 
public employees against politically motivated job actions.4  As 
initially drafted, the Act only applied to federal employees.5  
However, on July 19, 1940, the Hatch Act was amended to apply to 
employees of state and local governments.6 
Responding to decades of reform efforts7 and consistent criticisms 
of the Hatch Act’s broad scope, Congress passed the Hatch Act 
Modernization Act of 2012 (HAMA) after some incremental reforms 
and failed attempts at wholesale changes proved to insufficiently 
address the concerns regarding the Hatch Act’s disparate effect on 
state and local employees and its federal employee penalty 
provisions.8  HAMA significantly limited the scope of the original 
Hatch Act’s provisions, returning most of the responsibility for 
regulating the political activities of state and local government 
employees back to the states from the federal government.9  While 
critics of the Hatch Act’s application to state and local employees 
praise HAMA as a step in the right direction,10 it lacks a mechanism 
for reversing the widespread incorporation of the Hatch Act’s stricter 
political prohibitions in state regulations and the political activity 
policies of government agencies.11 
																																																																																																																																
 4. James S. Bowman & Jonathan P. West, State Government ‘‘Little Hatch 
Acts’’ in an Era of Civil Service Reform: The State of the Nation, 29 REV. PUB. 
PERSONNEL ADMIN. 20, 21 (2009). 
 5. See Scott J. Bloch, The Judgment of History: Faction, Political Machines, and 
the Hatch Act, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 225, 231–33 (2005). 
 6. Act of July 19, 1940, ch. 640, Pub. L. No. 76-753, 54 Stat. 767. 
 7. While many attempts to reform the Hatch Act failed, two incremental reforms 
were passed in 1974 and 1993, respectively. See infra Part I.D, I.F. 
 8. 5 U.S.C. §§1501–1508 (2012); 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321–7326 (2012).  In addition, see 
infra Parts I.D–G for a discussion of reform attempts leading up to HAMA. 
 9. See infra Part I.G.2 (discussing HAMA’s impact on state and local 
employees).  This applied with the exception of state employees whose salaries are 
fully funded by the federal government. Hatch Act: State, D.C., or Local 
Employees—Who is Covered/Who is Not Covered, U.S. OFFICE SPECIAL COUNSEL, 
https://osc.gov/pages/hatchact-affectsme.aspx (select “I am a State, D.C., or Local 
Employee”; then follow “I” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 16, 2015) [hereinafter 
Covered State and Local Employees]. 
 10. See infra Part I.G for a discussion of HAMA and its supporters. 
 11. See infra Part II.A.1 for a discussion of the disparate state political activities 
laws, and Part II.B for a discussion of HAMA’s impact on bi- and multi-state 
agencies.  The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey is used as a 
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The government’s interest in regulating the political activities of its 
employees is twofold: first to prevent coercion, and second to 
preserve the appearance of integrity and neutrality within each 
department and agency.12  However, some politicians question 
whether allegations of political coercion and corruption remain as 
dangerous today as they were in 1939.13  For instance, while signing 
HAMA’s predecessor, the Hatch Act Reform Amendments (HARA) 
in 1993, former United States President Bill Clinton issued an 
accompanying statement that reflected his belief that many of the 
Hatch Act’s provisions were no longer necessary.  Clinton reasoned 
that many of the concerns that gave rise to the passage of the Hatch 
Act are no longer sufficient to justify the Act’s extensive prohibitions 
against political participation by federal and state government 
employees.14  By including the “vigilant press” in his cited reasons 
behind loosening restrictions on Hatch Act-covered employees, 
Clinton presaged the current state of affairs where the media has 
become an integral part of our everyday lives.15  Clinton’s remarks 
account for the fact that social and technological developments might 
provide sufficient deterrence against improper political participation, 
without some inherent disadvantages of the Hatch Act.16  Modern 
society demands the reexamination of the realities of the public 
workplace and the political engagement of public employees.  This 
Note will not address technology at length; rather it will focus on a 
discussion of practical policy concerns.  However, the rapidly 
changing climate of media, social media, and technology lays a 
backdrop for the ripeness and continued relevance of a conversation 
about the status of political activities policies for public employees. 
Advancements in digital communication have dramatically 
increased societal interconnectedness.17  Such interconnectedness 
provides the media with the tools to police the political activities of 
																																																																																																																																
representative example of an agency that still utilizes employment contracts that 
embody the Hatch Act’s former, stricter, prohibitions. 
 12. See Bloch, supra note 5, at 271–74.  The author also cites “preventing 
corruption, ensuring a professional civil service, preserving respect for the 
government” as rationales behind the Hatch Act. Id. 
 13. See, e.g., Remarks on Signing the Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 1993, 
supra note 1. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Id. 
 16. See Id. 
 17. Alex Litovsky, Wearable Tech Makes for a More Interconnected Workforce, 
TOOLBOX.COM (Feb. 18, 2014), http://it.toolbox.com/blogs/itmanagement/wearable-
tech-makes-for-a-more-interconnected-workforce-58985. 
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government employees.18  Armed with portable electronics, the media 
and voters are quick to expose perceived corruption.19  Regardless of 
whether the actions of state employees actually violate the Hatch Act, 
“the mere appearance of impropriety is often enough to draw 
negative attention.”20  Since the media deters at least some intentional 
misconduct, the Hatch Act as currently applied is unnecessary and 
provides no unique benefits, yet it causes administrative confusion 
and unnecessary penalties for various employees.21 
Technological advancement and interconnectivity can also be a 
double-edged sword.  As a result of these two factors, it is easier than 
ever for government employees to unwittingly violate the Hatch Act 
by using their work computers, phones, or e-mail accounts to express 
their political views in the workplace.22  E-mails and social media 
messages are constantly sent to individuals’ cell phones, and the ease 
of sharing information accompanying “smart phones” increases the 
probability that government employees might forward messages 
without carefully considering the recipient(s) and whether the 
messages include political expressions that violate the Hatch Act.23  
Additionally, the definitions of “on duty,” “off duty,” and 
“workplace” have become more fluid with the rise of 
telecommuting.24 
																																																																																																																																
 18. Jason C. Miller, The Unwise and Unconstitutional Hatch Act: Why State and 
Local Government Employees Should be Free to Run for Public Office, 34 S. ILL. U. 
L.J. 313, 327 (2010) (“The media and voters are hostile to political machines, and 
merit-based civil service is now well established.  Bloggers and the internet make it 
possible to expose and combat partisanship without laws restricting candidacies.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 19. Id.; see also RICK STAPENHURST, THE MEDIA’S ROLE IN CURBING 
CORRUPTION (2000), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/WBI/Resources/
wbi37158.pdf; Jonathan Jacobs, Chafee Pulls Three RI State Employees from 
Fundraiser Committee, GoLocalProv (July 23, 2013), http://www.golocalprov.com/
politics/chafee-pulls-three-ri-state-employees-from-fundraiser-committee/; Antonio 
Suarez-Martinez, Use of the Internet in the Fight Against Corruption: The Google 
Decision and the Law of Unintended Consequences, LEXOLOGY (May 29, 2014), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=4604832a-51e5-4a53-92b6-
3b6bb597eb75. 
 20. Jacobs, supra note 19. 
 21. See Miller, supra note 18, at 327. 
 22. See Martin Austermuhle, Federal Worker Runs Afoul of Law by Tweeting 
for D.C. Council Candidate, WAMU 88.5 (Feb. 6, 2014), http://wamu.org/news/
14/02/06/federal_worker_runs_afoul_of_law_by_using_twitter_to_back_dc_council_
candidate. 
 23. See id.; see also Anna A. Vlasova, The Hatch Act and the World of Social 
Media, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_
101_201_practice_series/the_hatch_act_and_the_world_of_social_media.html. 
 24. Alice Lipowicz, Rules for Political Advocacy for Teleworkers in Question, 
FCW (May 25, 2012), http://fcw.com/articles/2012/05/25/telework-hatch-act.aspx. 
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The increased probability of unintentional Hatch Act violations 
chills legitimate free speech and may discourage or invalidate quality 
political candidates.25  Confusion over employee coverage under the 
Hatch Act may arise in many situations, such as when covered 
workers work alongside an employee who is not covered by the Hatch 
Act.26  Increased public discussion of potential Hatch Act violations 
by public employees also encourages federal, state, and local agencies 
to safeguard their public image by enforcing political prohibitions that 
vastly exceed those now required by HAMA.27 
Dramatic differences in state law regulations enacted in accordance 
with the Hatch Act exacerbate these issues as agencies seek to apply 
broad policies to avoid violations of diverse state regulations.28  
Because most states have implemented their own political activities 
policies, disparities between state and federal policies can also 
generate confusion among employees.29  Not only have the states 
passed a wide variety of political activities laws that may be more or 
less restrictive than the Hatch Act’s requirements, but individual 
agencies have also imposed their own political activities rules.30  This 
Note argues that additional changes to the Hatch Act, despite the 
progress of HAMA, are necessary to produce predictable limits on 
political speech for government employees, minimize the chilling of 
legitimate political discourse, and to eliminate costs associated with 
current conflicting regulations. 
Part I of this Note analyzes the United States’ history of regulating 
the political activities of government employees, state regulations 
applied in conjunction with the Hatch Act, and the constitutionality 
of these prohibitions.  Part II of this Note addresses Hatch Act 
implementation problems that remain after HAMA.  Examples of 
																																																																																																																																
 25. For a discussion of the chilling effect of the Hatch Act, see Miller, supra note 
18, at 329–30, and infra Part II.A.1. 
 26. Miller, supra note 18, at 329–30.  For example, a state employee who receives 
federal grants may be subject to the Hatch Act’s provisions in addition to the state’s 
political activity law, while a co-worker who does not receive federal funds would 
only be subject to the state law.  If the state law differs from the Hatch Act, that may 
lead to confusion, as some employees would face different restrictions. 
 27. For a discussion of reasons why agencies might want to retain strict 
prohibitions, see infra Part II.B.  A main concern is that public image may control 
policy objectives for bi- and multi-state agencies such as the Port Authority of New 
York and New Jersey.  A case study is used to examine how different agencies 
address this issue. 
 28. See, e.g., infra Part I.G.1. 
 29. See infra Part I.H (discussing “Little Hatch Acts”). 
 30. See infra Part I.H (comparing state policies); infra Part II.B (discussing agency 
policies). 
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these problems include the chilling of legitimate discourse because of 
disparate state regulation; the lack of guidance for bi- and multi-state 
agencies such as the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey 
(Port Authority), which this Note uses as an example; and the 
inconsistent adjudication of Hatch Act violations caused by rigid 
penalty provisions.  Part III of this Note analyzes and discusses the 
viability of four solutions: (1) modification of the Hatch Act’s penalty 
provisions, (2) exemption for all lower-level employees from the 
Hatch Act’s prohibitions, (3) addition of a statute of limitations, and 
(4) implementation of state guidelines to overcome the disparity in 
the enforcement of the Hatch Act and “Little Hatch Acts.”  Part III 
proceeds to evaluate the practicality of implementing each of these 
solutions and evaluates how they might be integrated into pending 
legislation.  This Note seeks to resolve the remaining issues with the 
Hatch Act post-HAMA and to suggest further changes and agency 
action to clarify the role of political activities laws in the lives of 
public employees. 
I.  FEDERAL REGULATION OF THE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF 
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES 
An American citizen’s right to participate in politics is not entirely 
free from government regulation.31  Federal enactments regulating the 
political activities of government employees have been in place since 
the late nineteenth century.32  In the landmark case on regulation of 
political activities, United States Civil Service Commission v. 
National Association of Letter Carriers, Justice White, writing for the 
majority, stated, “[n]either the right to associate nor the right to 
participate in political activities is absolute in any event . . . . Nor are 
the management, financing, and conduct of political campaigns 
wholly free from government regulation.”33  While the scope of the 
government’s authority to regulate its employees and their 
participation in political activities has been challenged judicially and 
through amendments to the Hatch Act, the government’s regulation 
of its employees’ political activities remains to this day.34 
While on its face the Hatch Act appears to affect only government 
employees, any law that limits the pool of eligible candidates for 
																																																																																																																																
 31. See U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 
567 (1973). 
 32. See Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (1883). 
 33. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 567. 
 34. See infra Parts I.C–G (discussing the constitutional challenges and 
amendments to the Hatch Act). 
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office indirectly restricts the right to vote.35  Modern dissatisfaction 
with federal regulations prohibiting certain categories of employees 
from participating in political activities is self-evident, illustrated by a 
steady stream of amendment proposals and constitutional challenges 
which sought to limit the scope of the Hatch Act’s prohibitions.36  This 
Part examines that history of the Hatch Act, constitutional challenges 
to the Hatch Act, and the evolution of its provisions regarding the 
political activities of government employees on the state and federal 
level. 
A. The Pendleton Act of 1883 
 The first congressional enactment passed to regulate the 
political activities of federal government employees was the 
Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act in 1883 (Pendleton Act).37  The 
Pendleton Act served as the predecessor to the Hatch Act in that it 
laid the groundwork for the Hatch Act’s prohibitions against political 
activity.38  The Pendleton Act sought to mend holes in the civil service 
system, which left it vulnerable to corruption.39  While movements to 
																																																																																																																																
 35. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972).  This Note will not discuss 
voting rights at length, as previous Supreme Court decisions have not discussed the 
Hatch Act’s impact on voting rights. See Miller, supra note 18, at 332.  However, it 
has been suggested that rational basis may not be the proper level of scrutiny for the 
candidacy restrictions as, “[s]ince 1947, constitutional law governing voting, ballot 
access, speech, and the federal spending power has evolved significantly.” Id.  Indeed, 
the Supreme Court has held that “the rights of voters and the rights of candidates do 
not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that affect candidates always have at 
least some theoretical, correlative effect on voters.” Bullock, 405 U.S. at 143.  It has 
been argued that while the Supreme Court has held in a line of patronage cases—
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (plurality opinion); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 
(1980); and Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62 (1990)—that there is a First 
Amendment right to be free from “viewpoint-based retaliation for engaging in 
political activity,” this right is only nominal “if the government can prohibit that same 
activity by enacting a content-based prohibition like the Hatch Act.” Anthony T. 
Kovalchick, Ending the Suppression: Why the Hatch Act Cannot Withstand 
Meaningful Constitutional Scrutiny, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 419, 435–36 (2008).  
Anthony Kovalchick argues that if the original intent of the Hatch Act was to 
“protect the First Amendment rights of federal employees, it was inherently self-
defeating.” Id. at 436.  He further argues that prohibitions on political activity 
sacrifice the “freedom to believe and associate” for the sake of the “freedom to not 
believe and not associate.” Id. 
 36. See infra Parts I.D–E. 
 37. Pendleton Civil Service Act, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, http://
www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/449725/Pendleton-Civil-Service-Act (last 
updated July 30, 2014). 
 38. See Bloch, supra note 5, at 230–31. 
 39. See id. at 229–34. 
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replace appointments through the spoils system40 with competitive 
examinations began in the 1860s, it was not until the 1880s that any 
substantive civil service reforms were passed.41  Some point to the 
1881 assassination of President Garfield by a “disappointed office 
seeker” as “an impressive . . . lesson of the need for the overthrow of 
the spoils system.”42  After the passage of the Pendleton Act, George 
William Curtis, a proponent of the bill, stated that prior to its passage: 
Every four years the whole machinery of the government is pulled 
to pieces . . . . The business of the nation and the legislation of 
Congress are subordinated to the distribution of plunder among 
eager partisans.  President, secretaries, senators, representatives are 
dogged, hunted, besieged, besought, denounced, and they become 
mere office brokers.43 
The Pendleton Act, passed in 1883 by an overwhelming majority, 
responded to the widespread public demand for civil service reform in 
reaction to the increased “incompetence, graft, corruption, and theft 
in federal departments and agencies.”44  The Act also prohibited the 
termination of government employees for political reasons and 
prohibited the solicitation of campaign donations on federal 
government property.45  Despite initially covering only those 
employees in the classified service,46 the Pendleton Act was soon 
extended to include almost all federal government employees.47 
In order to effectuate the Act’s purposes, Congress incorporated a 
provision into the Pendleton Act that granted the President the 
authority to issue rules necessary to carry out the Act.48  This 
provision established the Civil Service Commission (CSC) as an 
enforcement agency to oversee compliance with the Pendleton Act, 
which included regulations to prevent political patronage and 
coercion.49  President Arthur issued the first CSC Rule, Rule 1, which 
																																																																																																																																
 40. The spoils system is the practice of political patronage, wherein the winning 
political party gives government jobs to loyal supporters and friends.  This practice 
led to the inefficient execution of office-holders’ duties and major upheavals post-
election. See WILLIAM DUDLEY FOULKE, FIGHTING THE SPOILSMEN: REMINISCENCES 
OF THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM MOVEMENT 3–6 (1919). 
 41. Id. at 6–8. 
 42. Id. at 7. 
 43. Id. at 8. 
 44. See Bloch, supra note 5, at 230. 
 45. Pendleton Civil Service Act of 1883, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (1883). 
 46. See Bloch, supra note 5, at 231. 
 47. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 559–
60 (1973). 
 48. Id. at 558. 
 49. Id. 
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focused on preventing coercion by government employees.50  Rule 1 
was amended in 1907 to state that no person in executive civil service 
shall “use his official authority or influence for the purpose of 
interfering with an election or affecting the result thereof,” and that 
persons in the competitive classified service “shall take no active part 
in political management or in political campaigns.”51  Following 
allegations that Democratic Party politicians used Works Progress 
Administration (WPA) employees and jobs to gain unfair political 
advantages during the 1938 congressional elections, Senator Carl 
Hatch sponsored the bill that would become the Hatch Act.  The 
Hatch Act codified the Rule 1 political activity ban and broadened its 
scope to encompass almost all federal employees.52  Despite some 
opposition by the Democratic Party, President Roosevelt signed the 
Hatch Act into law on August 2, 1939.53 
B. The Hatch Act’s Prohibitions and Procedures 
A determination that the political activity or election is considered 
partisan triggered the Hatch Act’s prohibitions against participation 
in political activity and candidacy.54  The Office of Special Counsel 
(OSC), the agency that enforces the Hatch Act, defines political 
activity as “activity directed at the success or failure of a political 
party, candidate for partisan political office [or] partisan political 
group.”55  Therefore, political activity may occur outside the scope of 
an election.56  For example, activities such as soliciting funds for a 
political party, organizing political rallies, holding office in political 
clubs, wearing a political button at work, and assisting in partisan 
voter registration drives are all considered political activities under 
the Hatch Act.57  The Hatch Act designates which types of political 
																																																																																																																																
 50. 8 JAMES D. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF 
THE PRESIDENTS, 1789–1897, at 161 (1898). 
 51. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 559. 
 52. See Bloch, supra note 5, at 231. 
 53. See id. at 232–33. 
 54. See 5 C.F.R. § 151.101(g) (2014) 
 55. Hatch Act: Federal Employees—Less Restricted Employees, U.S. OFFICE 
SPECIAL COUNSEL, https://osc.gov/pages/hatchact-affectsme.aspx# (select “I am a 
Federal Employee”; then follow “II” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 16, 2015) 
[hereinafter Less Restricted Employees]. 
 56. See id. 
 57. Hatch Act: Federal Employees—Further Restricted Employees, U.S. OFFICE 
SPECIAL COUNSEL, https://osc.gov/pages/hatchact-affectsme.aspx# (select “I am a 
Federal Employee”; then follow “I” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 16, 2015) 
[hereinafter Further Restricted Employees]. 
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activities are prohibited or permitted for different categories of 
employees.58 
The Hatch Act restricts candidacy in partisan elections and 
candidacy remains restricted for certain federal employees after 
HAMA; therefore, the existence of a violation depends on whether 
the election is partisan.59  The Hatch Act defines a nonpartisan 
election as “an election at which none of the candidates is to be 
nominated or elected as representing a political party any of whose 
candidates for Presidential elector received votes in the last preceding 
election at which Presidential electors were selected.”60  State and 
local election laws create a rebuttable presumption that an election is 
nonpartisan.61  This presumption may be rebutted where there is 
evidence that “a candidate solicits or advertises the endorsement of a 
partisan political party or uses a political party’s resources to further 
his or her campaign;” however, such evidence is not always required.62  
An employee may be at risk of violating the Hatch Act and of 
participating in a partisan election if any candidates running in the 
election are working with a partisan political party, even if the 
employee does not himself represent any particular party.63  
Furthermore, the political position for which candidates are running 
is not outcome determinative, because offices that are filled through 
nonpartisan election in one district may be filled through partisan 
election in the next district.64 
																																																																																																																																
 58. See Further Restricted Employees, supra note 57; Less Restricted Employees, 
supra note 55. 
 59. See Further Restricted Employees, supra note 57; Less Restricted Employees, 
supra note 55. 
 60. 5 C.F.R. § 151.101(g) (2014); see also 5 U.S.C. § 1503 (2012). 
 61. See Special Counsel v. Yoho, 15 M.S.P.R. 409, 411–13 (1983), overruled on 
other grounds, Special Counsel v. Purnell, 37 M.S.P.R. 184 (1988); see also Hatch 
Act: State, D.C., or Local Employees—FAQs, U.S. OFFICE SPECIAL COUNSEL, 
https://osc.gov/pages/hatchact-affectsme.aspx# (select “I am a State, D.C., or Local 
Employee”; then follow “III” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 16, 2015) [hereinafter State 
and Local FAQs]. 
 62. See McEntee v. M.S.P.B., 404 F.3d 1320, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that 
the definition of a “partisan political office” “encompasses offices for which 
candidates are either nominated as representing a party or elected as representing a 
party,” that formal endorsement or selection by a major political party is not required 
for the election to be partisan, and that actual conduct of an election may rebut the 
presumption of a nonpartisan election); In re Broering, 1 P.A.R. 778, 779 (1955); see 
also State and Local FAQs, supra note 61. 
 63. See McEntee, 404 F.3d 1320; Special Counsel v. Campbell, 58 M.S.P.R. 170, 
178 (1993), aff’d, 27 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see also Miller, supra note 18, at 329. 
 64. See Miller, supra note 18, at 329. 
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Effective January 1, 1978, the CSC’s functions were split between 
the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the Merit Systems 
Protection Board (MSPB).65  The OSC was formed in 1979 as the 
investigative and prosecutorial arm of the MSPB.  The OSC, now an 
independent agency,66 is the entity authorized to issue advisory 
opinions pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 1212(f) and to investigate violations 
of the Hatch Act pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 1216(a)(2).67  Once an 
employee is charged with a violation by the OSC, the charges are 
adjudicated before the MSPB for corrective and/or disciplinary 
action.68  Any “employee or applicant for employment adversely 
affected or aggrieved by a final order or decision of the [MSPB]” may 
obtain judicial review.69  Appeals are to be filed in the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.70  The Hatch Act outlines 
penalty provisions for violations of the Act for federal and state or 
local employees independently.71 
1. Effects on Federal Employees 
While the basic principles behind the regulation of federal and 
state employees are similar, the Act addresses the distinct categories 
of employees covered and the specific prohibitions for federal and 
state employees separately.72  While there are more restrictions for 
federal employees, these restrictions change depending upon how the 
employee is classified.73  A federal employee may be placed into one 
of two categories: “further restricted” or “less restricted.”74  “Further 
restricted” employees consist mostly of employees in intelligence and 
enforcement-type agencies (except presidential appointees), as well 
as those in the Senior Executive Service.  The Senior Executive 
Service category also includes Administrative Law Judges, Contract 
																																																																																																																																
 65. See Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 36037, 92 Stat. 3783; Civil 
Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111. 
 66. In 1989, Congress enacted the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. 
No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16, which made the OSC an independent agency within the 
executive branch of the federal government. 
 67. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1212(f), 1216(a)(2) (2012). 
 68. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1504–1508 (2012); 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321–7326 (2012). 
 69. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a) (2012). 
 70. Id. § 7703(b). 
 71. Id. 
 72. An Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities (Hatch Act), 5 U.S.C. §§ 
1504–1508(2012); 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321–7326 (2012). 
 73. See § 7324(b)(2); see also Further Restricted Employees, supra note 57; Less 
Restricted Employees, supra note 55. 
 74. Further Restricted Employees, supra note 57; Less Restricted Employees, 
supra note 55. 
2015] PUTTING THE GOV'T BACK IN POLITICS 793 
Appeals Board Members, and Administrative Appeals Judges.75  All 
other federal executive branch employees76 fall under the “less 
restricted” category.77 
A less restricted federal employee is still limited in his or her 
political activities.  He may not (1) use his official authority or 
influence to affect the results of an election; (2) “knowingly solicit, 
accept, or receive a political contribution from any person;”78 (3) run 
for partisan political office; or (4) “knowingly solicit or discourage the 
participation in any political activity of any person who” has business 
before the employing office.79  Less restricted employees may not 
engage in political activity while on duty or on premises occupied “in 
the discharge of official duties by an individual employed or holding 
office in the Government of the United States or any agency or 
instrumentality thereof.”80  Additionally, less restricted employees are 
also restricted from engaging in political activity while in uniform, 
while wearing insignia identifying the employee’s office, or while 
operating a government or agency vehicle.81  Further restricted 
federal employees are prohibited from partaking in the 
aforementioned activities and are additionally restricted from taking 
an active part in partisan political campaigns or partisan political 
																																																																																																																																
 75. Further Restricted Employees, supra note 57. 
 76. Additionally, all District of Columbia employees fell under the Less 
Restricted Employees provisions until the implementation of HAMA. Less 
Restricted Employees, supra note 55. 
 77. Less Restricted Employees, supra note 55.  HAMA includes District of 
Columbia employees under the provisions for state and local employees. 5 U.S.C. § 
1501 (2012). 
 78. 5 U.S.C. § 7323(a)(2) (2012).   
Unless such person is—(A) a member of the same Federal labor 
organization as defined under section 7103(4) of this title or a Federal 
employee organization which as of the date of enactment of the Hatch Act 
Reform Amendments of 1993 had a multicandidate political committee (as 
defined under section 315(a)(4) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 
1971 (2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(4))); (B) not a subordinate employee; and (C) the 
solicitation is for a contribution to the multicandidate political committee 
(as defined under section 315(a)(4) of the Federal Election Campaign Act 
of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(4))) of such Federal labor organization as defined 
under section 7103(4) of this title or a Federal employee organization which 
as of the date of the enactment of the Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 
1993 had a multicandidate political committee (as defined under section 
315(a)(4) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 
441a(a)(4))). 
Id. 
 79. Id. § 7323(a)(4). 
 80. 5 C.F.R. § 733.106 (2014). 
 81. 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a) (2012). 
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management.82  The penalty for Hatch Act violations by federal 
employees is limited to a suspension of no less than thirty days or 
termination.83 
Not all types of political activity are forbidden under the Hatch 
Act’s provisions.  While the Act prohibits further restricted 
employees from taking an “active part in political management or in 
political campaigns,” it states that the employee retains the right to 
vote as he chooses and to express his opinion on political subjects and 
candidates.84  The Act also permits the OPM to allow employees from 
the areas in Maryland and Virginia which are in the “immediate 
vicinity of the District of Columbia,” or in a “municipality in which 
the majority of voters are employed by the Government of the United 
States,” to take an active part in the political management or political 
campaigns in their municipality or political subdivision.85  Further, the 
most recent version of the Act before HAMA allowed less restricted 
employees to take an “active part in political management or in 
political campaigns,” subject to the aforementioned restrictions.86  
The prohibition against taking an active part in the proscribed 
political activities is limited to those rules and proscriptions that had 
been developed under Civil Service Rule 1 up to the date of the 
passage of the 1940 Act.87 
2. Effects on State Employees 
The Hatch Act, as originally enacted, regulated the political 
activities of federal employees.88  The original statute was changed by 
a series of amendments in 1940 (1940 Amendments).  These 
amendments broadened the reach of the Hatch Act to include state 
and local employees whose salary is paid, in whole or in part, by 
grants from the federal government.89  They also included officers and 
																																																																																																																																
 82. Further Restricted Employees, supra note 57. 
 83. Hatch Act: Federal Employees—Penalties, U.S. OFFICE SPECIAL COUNSEL, 
https://osc.gov/pages/hatchact-affectsme.aspx# (select “I am a Federal Employee” 
then follow “III” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 16, 2015).  However, this penalty 
structure only applies to complaints initiated before January 27, 2013 pursuant to the 
HAMA. Id. 
 84. See U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 
559 (1973). 
 85. 5 U.S.C. § 7325 (2012) (note that the language regarding the exemption for 
the District of Columbia itself was part of HAMA). 
 86. 5 U.S.C. § 7323 (2012). 
 87. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 575–76. 
 88. See State and Local FAQs, supra note 61. 
 89. Act of July 19, 1940, ch. 640, Pub. L. No. 76-753, 54 Stat. 767. 
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employees of state and local agencies “whose principal employment is 
in connection with any activity which is financed in whole or in part 
by loans or grants made by the United States.”90  The 1940 
Amendments dramatically expanded the reach of the Hatch Act 
because law enforcement officers in receipt of a federal grant or state 
agencies receiving funding from a related federal program were 
included as covered employees. 91 
The 1940 Amendments92 meant that the Hatch Act restricted the 
political activity of individuals principally employed by state or local 
executive agencies who work in connection with programs financed in 
whole or in part by federal loans or grants.93  When an employee held 
two or more jobs, the individual’s form of “principal employment” 
was defined as the job that accounts for the most work time and the 
most earned income.94  A majority of employees covered under the 
Hatch Act work in programs connected to important federal projects, 
such as those related to public health, public welfare, housing, urban 
development, public works, agriculture, defense, transportation, and 
law enforcement.95  In addition, the Hatch Act also applies to 
employees of private, nonprofit organizations that work in connection 
with Head Start or Community Services Block Grant programs.96  
Notably, employees covered by the Hatch Act are still subject to the 
restrictions of the Hatch Act while on any type of leave (annual, sick, 
administrative, or without pay) or furlough.97 
State and local employees faced similar prohibitions as federal 
employees under the Hatch Act, as altered by the 1940 Amendments; 
however, there are significant differences between the Act’s 
																																																																																																																																
 90. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 561. 
 91. Covered State and Local Employees, supra note 9. 
 92. Please note that while subsequent amendments such as HARA and HAMA 
have altered the Hatch Act, they did not replace the act itself; therefore the act is still 
referred to as the Hatch Act. 
 93. Covered State and Local Employees, supra note 9.  This provision has been 
altered by the passage of HAMA. See infra Part I.G. 
 94. Covered State and Local Employees, supra note 9.  Under HAMA, state and 
local employees must have their salaries fully funded by the federal government to 
fall under the Hatch Act. See infra Part I.G. 
 95. Covered State and Local Employees, supra note 9. 
 96. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9851(a) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 9918(b)(1) (2012).  Under 
42 U.S.C. § 9904(e) (1982), the Hatch Act applied to Head Start and Community 
Services Block Grant Program participants.  This provision was repealed by HARA, 
Pub. L. No. 103-94, § 6, 107 Stat. 1001, 1005 (1993); however, the Hatch Act 
regulation was reinstated in a similar form in 1998. Pub. L. No. 105-285, title II, § 201, 
112 Stat. 2747 (1998). 
 97. See Covered State and Local Employees, supra note 9. 
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application to state and local employees and federal employees.98  
State employees, like federal employees, are subject to the 
prohibition on using authority to influence or interfere with an 
election or nomination, running for partisan election,99 and asking 
state or local officials to give to an organization for political 
purposes.100  However, unlike federal employees, who are consistently 
covered, the status of a state employee may change.101  Further, state 
and local employees are more likely to have co-workers who are not 
“Hatch Act-covered.”102  Generally, federal employees are more 
restricted than state and local employees, and even more so after 
many amendments have distinguished the regulations that apply to 
state and local employees.103 
The MSPB104 dictates that an employee is covered by the Hatch 
Act when, “as a normal and foreseeable incident of his principal 
employment, [the employee] performs duties in connection with an 
activity financed in whole or in part by federal loans or grants.”105  “If 
an employee meets this standard, the source of the employee’s salary 
is irrelevant.”106  This means that an employee who worked with a 
program that received a federal grant, such as a police officer who 
uses a police dog funded by Homeland Security, would fall under the 
pre-HAMA Hatch Act.107  Such employees would then be subject to 
																																																																																																																																
 98. See id. 
 99. This provision is no longer in effect post-HAMA. See infra Part I.G. 
 100. Covered State and Local Employees, supra note 9. 
 101. The coverage of a particular state or local employee depends on whether they 
work in connection with federal funds. See Covered State and Local Employees, 
supra note 9. 
 102. See id. 
 103. Over the years, the restrictions that apply to state and local employees have 
diminished. See infra Parts I.E–G (discussing the various amendments). 
 104. The MSPB is a quasi-judicial agency established in 1979 to replace the United 
States Civil Service Commission. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), Public 
Law No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111.  The MSPB adjudicates cases brought by the U.S. 
Office of Special Counsel (OSC).  The OSC is the independent federal agency that 
investigates and prosecutes violations of the Hatch Act and other prohibited 
personnel practices. See About, U.S. OFFICE SPECIAL COUNSEL, https://osc.gov/
Pages/about.aspx (last visited Feb. 16, 2015). 
 105. State and Local FAQs, supra note 61 (citing Special Counsel v. Gallagher, 44 
M.S.P.R. 57, 61 (1990)). 
 106. State and Local FAQs, supra note 61 (citing Special Counsel v. Williams, 56 
M.S.P.R. 277, 283–84 (1993), aff’d, Williams v. M.S.P.B., 55 F.3d 917 (4th Cir. 1995)). 
 107. Joe Davidson, Bill Would Update Hatch Act, Which Regulates Federal 
Worker Involvement in Politics, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2012, http://www.washington
post.com/politics/bill-would-update-hatch-act-which-regulates-federal-worker-
involvement-in-politics/2012/03/07/gIQA67D2xR_story.html. 
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punishment for any violation.108  Notably, however, if the employee’s 
conduct does not satisfy this standard, he or she may still be subject to 
punishment if the salary the employee receives is federally funded.109 
The adjudicative and punitive process for state and local employees 
differs from that for federal employees.110  For state or local 
employees, the statute provides that when the MSPB provides a 
notice of determination that the employee has violated Section 1502 
of the Hatch Act and that the violation warrants removal, the 
employee must be removed from employment within thirty days.111  If 
the employee is not terminated, federal funding in the form of grants 
or loans shall be withheld from the employing agency in an amount 
equal to two years’ pay at the rate the employee was receiving at the 
time of the violation.112  If, after timely removal, the employee has 
been appointed within eighteen months to any office or employment 
in another state or local agency, which does not receive federal 
funding, the same amount will be withheld from the initial agency.113  
Additionally, if the employee has been appointed within eighteen 
months to a state or local agency that receives federal funds, the same 
amount will be withheld from that agency.114 
The 1940 Amendments also allow states to further regulate their 
own employees, including those employees covered by the Hatch 
Act.115  Most states have passed their own political activities laws, 
which have been commonly dubbed “Little Hatch Acts” because they 
are typically modeled after the federal act.116  “Little Hatch Acts” 
vary by state, but they often carry similar prohibitions to the Hatch 
Act, except that they apply only to state and local employees.117  
Additionally, many local governments and municipalities have also 
implemented their own regulations regarding the political activities of 
																																																																																																																																
 108. See 5 U.S.C. § 1506 (2012). 
 109. See State and Local FAQs, supra note 61. 
 110. See § 1506. 
 111. Id. § 1506(a). 
 112. Id. § 1506(b). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See Hatch Act: State, D.C., or Local Employees—Hatch Act Modernization 
Act Guidance for State and Local Employees, U.S. OFFICE SPECIAL COUNSEL, 
https://osc.gov/pages/hatchact-affectsme.aspx# (select “I am a State, D.C., or Local 
Employee” then follow “VI.” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 16, 2015) [hereinafter 
HAMA Guidance]. 
 116. See Staff and Political Activity—Statutes, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/50statetablestaffandpoliticalactivitystatutes.aspx 
(last updated Feb. 2015). 
 117. Id. 
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public employees.118  These state and local regulations became 
particularly relevant after later changes to how state and local 
employees were treated under the Hatch Act.119 
C. Constitutional Challenges to the Hatch Act’s Prohibitions 
The passage of the Hatch Act and the 1940 Amendments—and 
their application to particular employees and actions—has spawned 
constitutional challenges that have reached the Supreme Court.120  A 
pair of cases in 1947 first dealt with the constitutionality of the Hatch 
Act.121  In these cases, the Supreme Court explored what interest the 
federal government has over its own employees and state employees, 
and whether this interest interferes with an employee’s First 
Amendment rights.122  Ultimately, the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the federal employee provisions of the Hatch Act 
in United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, and the state and 
local provisions in Mitchell’s companion case Oklahoma v. United 
States Civil Service Commission.123  Both cases addressed the Hatch 
																																																																																																																																
 118. See, e.g., Callaghan v. City of S. Portland, 76 A.3d 348 (Me. 2013). 
 119. For a discussion of later changes to the status of state and local employees 
under the Hatch Act, see infra Parts I.F–G. 
 120. While this section focuses on cases heard by the Supreme Court, there are a 
number of circuit court cases regarding the Hatch Act. See, e.g., Molina-Crespo v. 
M.S.P.B., 547 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2008); Williams v. M.S.PB., 55 F.3d 917 (4th Cir. 
1995); Blaylock v. M.S.P.B., 851 F.2d 1348 (11th Cir. 1988). 
 121. See United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947); Oklahoma v. U.S. 
Civil Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947). 
 122. See Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75; Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n., 330 U.S. 
127; U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 556 
(1973). 
 123. See Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75.  Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service 
Commission held that the Hatch Act does not violate the sovereignty of states under 
the Tenth Amendment. 330 U.S. 127, 142.  As of the date of publication, while some 
cases have applied for certiorari on related issues, there are currently none before the 
Supreme Court.  One promising attempt to garner judicial intervention on the issue 
of whether states could make independent personnel decisions based on perceived 
violations of the Hatch Act failed to obtain certiorari. See Utah Dep’t of Human 
Servs. v. Hughes, 2007 UT 30, 156 P.3d 820, cert denied, 552 U.S. 826 (2007); see also 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hughes v. Utah Dep’t of Human Servs., 552 U.S. 826 
(2007) (No. 06-1717), 2007 WL 1850378.  Another presented questions of “whether 
the Hatch Act as applied to congressional candidacies illegally imposes a fourth 
qualification for eligibility to Congress in violation of the Qualifications Clause, U.S. 
Const. Art. I, Sec. 2, cl.2,” “whether the Hatch Act should be construed to exclude 
federal candidacies from the Act’s ban on seeking partisan elective office,” and 
“whether the Hatch Act is unconstitutionally overbroad by prohibiting candidacies of 
all federal employees regardless of grade of employment, job function or job 
responsibility.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at *ii, Merle v. United States, 541 U.S. 
972 (2004) (No. 03-934), 2003 WL 23119176.  While it is possible that a related case 
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Act’s applicability to certain employees on the basis of the First 
Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and 
rights reserved to the people in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.124 
Mitchell was the first in a line of cases addressing the 
constitutionality of the Hatch Act.125  In Mitchell, members of a union 
brought an action to prevent enforcement of a portion of Section 9(a) 
of the Hatch Act, which states “[n]o officer or employee in the 
executive branch of the Federal Government . . . shall take any active 
part in political management or in political campaigns.”126  Only one 
appellant, Poole, had actually been charged with a violation in 
connection with his position on a committee for a political party and 
position as a poll worker and paymaster for party poll workers.  
Because of this distinction, the other appellants’ issues were 
dismissed.127 
Poole argued that the Hatch Act violated his First Amendment 
right to free speech and Fifth Amendment right to due process, and 
that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments reserved a right to political 
activity to the people.128  The Court acknowledged that the First and 
Fifth Amendments were implicated, but was not swayed by Poole’s 
attempt to differentiate between political activity after hours and 
political activity on the job.129  Justice Reed, writing for the majority, 
asserted that First Amendment rights “are subject to the elemental 
need for order without which the guarantees of civil rights to others 
would be a mockery.”130  Justice Reed weighed the First and Fifth 
Amendment rights against “a congressional enactment to protect a 
democratic society against the supposed evil of political partisanship 
by classified employees of government.”131  Poole also argued that his 
actions were nonpartisan; however, the Court responded that it would 
accept that Congress considered even nonpartisan activity to be 
dangerous.132  In the majority opinion, Justice Reed wrote, “[c]ourts 
																																																																																																																																
may garner Supreme Court attention, given the prospective nature of cases not 
currently before the Supreme Court, this Note will not discuss Supreme Court 
intervention at length. 
 124. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75; Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n., 330 U.S. 127. 
 125. See generally Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75. 
 126. Id. at 82. 
 127. Id. at 89–90. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 95. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 96. 
 132. Id. at 100–04. 
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will interfere only when such regulation passes beyond the general 
existing conception of governmental power.”133 
The Court’s holding established a deferential standard of review, 
ultimately leaving the management of civil service employees to 
Congress and the President.134  Justice Reed wrote, “Congress and the 
President are responsible for an efficient public service.  If, in their 
judgment, efficiency may be best obtained by prohibiting active 
participation by classified employees in politics as party officers or 
workers, we see no constitutional objection.”135  This deferential 
standard has continued.  However, in several more recent circuit 
court cases, particularly in the Eleventh and Second Circuits, 
increased judicial scrutiny has become commonplace.136  Despite these 
decisions, the history of the Hatch Act’s development has been 
steeped in deference.137 
The Supreme Court upheld Mitchell138 in Letter Carriers, and held 
that the First Amendment does not invalidate a law barring partisan 
political conduct by federal employees.139  The government, the Court 
asserted, maintains an interest in the speech of its employees that is 
stronger than that of citizens in general.140  The Court stated, “an Act 
																																																																																																																																
 133. Id. at 102. 
 134. Bloch, supra note 5, at 256. 
 135. Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 99. 
 136. Bloch, supra note 5, at 248–49 (citing Blaylock v. M.S.P.B., 851 F.2d 1348 
(11th Cir. 1988)); Biller v. M.S.P.B., 863 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1988).  For example, the 
Second Circuit in Biller found that the Hatch Act’s Legislative history “mandate[d] a 
construction of the Act in favor of First Amendment rights.” Biller, 863 F.2d at 1086. 
 137. See Bloch, supra note 5, at 229. 
 138. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (holding that an employee could be prevented from 
holding a party office, working at the polls, and acting as party paymaster for other 
party workers). 
 139. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 556 
(1973). 
 140. Id. at 564 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (holding 
that the government has an interest in regulating the conduct and speech of its 
employees that differs from its interest in citizen speech, and that there must be a 
balance between the employees’ interests as citizens in commenting on matters of 
public concern and the interest of the government in promoting efficient services to 
the public)).  When balancing the Hatch Act with the First Amendment, it may be 
helpful to look to the area of patronage and the constitutional law related to it to 
inform our study of how the Hatch Act can survive constitutional scrutiny.  The 
Hatch Act was established in the tradition of favoring merit over patronage.  In a 
series of opinions on the issue, the Supreme Court has consistently held that 
patronage policies in hiring and firing low-level government employees are 
unconstitutional.  For example, in Elrod v. Burns, the Court held that public 
employers could not dismiss non-policymaking employees because of their political 
affiliation, as it would violate the First Amendment. 427 U.S. 347, 372–73 (1976) 
(plurality opinion).  The Court quoted Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 
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of Congress going no farther would in our view unquestionably be 
valid.”141  It further proposed that a statute would be valid if it forbid 
activities such as organizing or actively participating in fundraising for 
a political party, running for partisan public office, managing a 
partisan political campaign, or soliciting votes for a partisan 
candidate.142 
The Court in Letter Carriers appealed to legislative history to 
assert that it is the will of Congress to have broader regulation to 
protect employees.143  Writing for the majority, Justice White cited the 
1972 Senate hearings regarding proposed legislation liberalizing the 
political activities prohibitions144 and posited that “[p]erhaps Congress 
at some time will come to a different view of the realities of political 
life and Government service; but that is its current view of the matter, 
and we are not now in any position to dispute it.  Nor, in our view, 
does the Constitution forbid it.”145  The congressional inaction cited 
																																																																																																																																
(1943), a prior case where it had considered the same issue, in stating that “(i)f there 
is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, 
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other 
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.” 
Elrod, 427 U.S. at 356.  Subsequently, in Branti v. Finkel, the Court held that a public 
employer could dismiss an employee if it is able to show that party affiliation was “an 
appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved.” 
445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980).  Following Branti, the Court in Rutan v. Republican Party 
of Ill. held that “promotion, transfer, recall, and hiring decisions involving low-level 
government employees may [not] constitutionally be based on party affiliation.” 497 
U.S. 62, 65 (1990). 
 141. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 556. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 566 (“It may be urged that prohibitions against coercion are sufficient 
protection; but, for many years, the joint judgment of the Executive and Congress has 
been that, to protect the rights of federal employees with respect to their jobs and 
their political acts and beliefs, it is not enough merely to forbid one employee to 
attempt to influence or coerce another.”). 
 144. Hearings were held during the 92nd Congress before the Committee on Post 
Office and Civil Service regarding S. 3374 and S. 3417. William Hibsher, Assault on 
Hatch Act Signals Political Activity for Government Workers, 47 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
509, 528 (1973).  While the bill was reintroduced during the next session, the bill 
never made it past committee. See S.235—Federal Employees Political Activities 
Act: Summary, CONGRESS.GOV, https://beta.congress.gov/bill/93rd-congress/senate-
bill/235 (last visited Feb. 16, 2015). 
 145. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 567.  The Chairman of the Civil Service 
Commission stated that, ‘‘the prohibitions against active participation in partisan 
political management and partisan political campaigns constitute the most significant 
safeguards against coercion . . . .’’ Id. at 566–67 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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by the Court did not last long, as seen in the first wave of reforms the 
following year.146 
D. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 
In 1974, Congress substantially altered the status of state and local 
government employees under the Hatch Act, ostensibly in response 
to Mitchell and Letter Carriers.147  The Federal Election Campaign 
Act Amendments of 1974 (FECA Amendments) made several 
important changes.148  First, state and local government employees 
were now able to run in non-partisan elections.149  Second, the 
language prohibiting state and local government employees from 
taking “an active part in political management or political campaigns” 
was replaced with language prohibiting being “a candidate for 
elective office.”150  Therefore, unlike their federal counterparts, state 
and local employees were now able to campaign for and hold office in 
political organizations.151 
E. Hatch Act Amendment Attempts: 1976, 1977, 1988, and 1990 
Following the FECA Amendments, it only took two years before 
another Hatch Act amendment made its way through the House and 
																																																																																																																																
 146. See Louis Lawrence Boyle, Reforming Civil Service Reform: Should the 
Federal Government Continue to Regulate State and Local Government 
Employees?, 7 J.L. & POL. 243, 256 (1991) (“Although Congress passed no reforms in 
the 1960s, it established a commission to study the matter, and many of their 
recommendations were included in later reform proposals.  Due to the continuing 
protests from the states, it is not surprising that, when Congress again became zealous 
about reform after the Watergate incident in 1972, it turned its attention once again 
to reforms in the Hatch Act and even included two reforms in the same measure.  In 
1974, Congress amended the Hatch Act to resolve some of the states’ concerns by 
loosening somewhat the restrictions on the political activity of state and local 
government employees.”). 
 147. Id. at 256–57.  Boyle also cites the Watergate incident as a driving force 
behind the reforms. Id. at 256. 
 148. Act of October 15, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263. 
 149. Id. at § 401, 88 Stat. at 1290 (“Section 1502(a)(3) of this title does not prohibit 
any state or local officer or employee from being a candidate in any election if none 
of the candidates is to be nominated or elected at such election as representing a 
party any of whose candidates for presidential elector received votes in the last 
preceding election at which presidential electors were selected.”). 
 150. Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 1502.  Federal employees remained prohibited from 
taking an active part in political management or political campaigns for nearly two 
decades. See infra Part I.F (discussing how HARA’s reforms impacted federal 
employees). 
 151. § 401, 88 Stat. at 1290; see also 5 C.F.R. 151.101(i) (2014) (defining elective 
office as “any office which is voted upon at an election . . . but does not include 
political party office”). 
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Senate.  In 1976, the Hatch Act Amendments bill was proposed in an 
attempt to lift most restrictions on federal employees’ ability to run 
for office or support partisan candidates.152  Additionally, this bill had 
added sections “designed to prevent political coercion of Federal 
employees by their superiors.”153  However, President Ford vetoed the 
legislation.  Upon doing so, he stated: 
If this bill were to become law, I believe pressure could be brought 
to bear on Federal employees in extremely subtle ways beyond the 
reach of any anti-coercion statute so that they would inevitably feel 
compelled to engage in partisan political activity.  This would be bad 
for the employee, bad for the government, and bad for the public.154 
In 1977, as a presidential candidate, Jimmy Carter promised federal 
labor unions that he would sign the Hatch Act reform plan that 
President Ford had vetoed the year before.155  However, during his 
presidency, he had second thoughts about the reforms.156  After the 
legislation passed in the House, Jimmy Carter asked Senator 
Abraham Ribicoff to sit on the Hatch Act revision bill so that the 
Senate would not be able to vote on it.157  The bill never came to a 
vote.158 
Unsuccessful amendments to the Hatch Act were also proposed in 
1988 and 1990.  The Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 1988 would 
have allowed off-duty federal workers to run for office, manage 
campaigns, and raise money for candidates and political parties.159  
They also would have been able to endorse candidates as long as they 
did not use their job titles.160  While the bill passed in the House, it 
																																																																																																																																
 152. James M. Naughton, Ford Vetoes Bill to Ease Hatch Act, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
13, 1976, available at http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive/pdf?res=FA0A12FC3F5
F117A93C1A8178FD85F428785F9. 
 153. Id. 
 154. President’s Remarks Upon Vetoing the Hatch Act Amendments Bill, 2 PUB. 
PAPERS 1114–15 (Apr. 12, 1976). 
 155. Mike Causey, Candidates’ Promises, Especially to Federal Workers, Are Not 
Guarantees, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 1988, http://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/
local/1988/08/04/candidates-promises-especially-to-federal-workers-are-not-
guarantees/1df34635-a403-4404-9ff2-ddfe545b4b8a/. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. H.R.3400—Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 1988, CONGRESS.GOV, https://
www.congress.gov/bill/100th-congress/house-bill/3400 (last visited Feb. 16, 2015).  
The Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 1988 were introduced to the House as the 
Federal Employees’ Political Activities Act of 1987. Id. 
 160. Mike Causey, Revising The Hatch Act, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 1987, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1987/10/04/revising-the-hatch-act/82c63ed9-
768c-46f7-836b-7b8c7b0d6fb7/. 
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never made it out of committee in the Senate.161  However, the bill 
was reintroduced in 1989 as the Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 
1990 and passed in the Senate with changes,162 which were approved 
by the House.163 
The proposed legislation of 1990, Hatch Act Reform Amendments 
of 1990, came very close to becoming law.164  It was one of the most 
successful attempts to substantively reform the Hatch Act’s 
restrictions on political activities since the Act was enacted fifty-one 
years prior.165  Under the bill, federal employees would have been 
allowed to hold office in political groups, publicly endorse candidates, 
organize fundraisers and political meetings, and distribute campaign 
literature.166  They would, however, still have been barred from 
seeking public office or participating in political activities in the 
workplace.167  Upon returning the bill without a signature, President 
George H. W. Bush stated: 
History shows that such a reversal in the role of partisan politics in 
the ethic of public service would inevitably lead to repoliticizing the 
Federal work force . . . .  Public servants who are subjected to direct 
or indirect partisan political pressures understandably would often 
be reluctant to file criminal complaints against their superiors or 
peers, possibly putting their livelihoods in jeopardy.  They deserve 
better protection than that.168 
The Senate upheld President Bush’s veto by a two-vote margin.169 
																																																																																																																																
 161. H.R. 3400 (100th): Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 1988, GOVTRACK, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/100/hr3400 (last visited Feb. 16, 2015). 
 162. Notably, the changes made to H.R. 20 included permitting D.C. area 
employees to participate in local political activities and barred employment in non-
elected positions of those who the MSPB determined had violated the Act on two 
occasions. See H.R. Res. 20, 101st Congress (1990). 
 163. H.R. 20 (101st): Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 1990, GOVTRACK, https://
www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/101/hr20 (last visited Feb. 16, 2015). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Richard L. Berke, Senate Upholds Veto of Bill on U.S. Workers in Politics, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1990, http://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/22/us/senate-upholds-
veto-of-bill-on-us-workers-in-politics.html?pagewanted=2&src=pm (stating that 
while the House overrode the veto 327 to 93, the vote of 65 to 35 in the Senate was 
two votes short of overriding the veto). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval the 
Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 1990, 1 PUB. PAPERS 830, 831 (June 15, 1990). 
 169. See Berke, supra note 165. 
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F. The Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 1993 
Finally, in 1993, President Clinton signed and passed HARA.170  
With a Democrat as President for the first time in twelve years,171 
HARA passed with strong support from Senate and House 
Democrats.172  During the 103rd Congress, both chambers had a 
Democratic majority.173  HARA permitted federal employees and 
postal workers to manage campaigns, fundraise, and hold positions 
within political parties on their own time.174  These changes were 
accompanied by the assurance that “Hatch Act-covered” employees 
would still be unable to run for partisan political election and that the 
federal workplace would remain off limits to partisan political 
activity.175 
While HARA made significant changes to the Hatch Act, 
eventually officials inside the OSC sought reform.176  One of the main 
contentions was that HARA’s prohibition on partisan political 
participation by state and local employees operated as an incumbent 
protection device and that necessary reforms were overlooked.177  
They claimed that the prohibition effectively acted as an incumbent 
protection device by preventing many qualified candidates from 
running,178 especially in certain smaller localities where many public 
																																																																																																																																
 170. See Remarks on Signing the Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 1993, supra 
note 1. 
 171. President Ford and President H. W. Bush, both Republicans, vetoed the only 
two bills that made it through both chambers.  See supra Part I.E for a discussion of 
previous attempts at Hatch Act reform.  It is particularly relevant that all of the failed 
attempts at reform (with the exception of the legislation that died under Jimmy 
Carter) were under Republican presidents.  The situation in 1993, with a Democrat as 
President and a Democratic majority in both chambers, was prime for the passage of 
HARA. 
 172. See 139 CONG. REC. S 8,937 (daily ed. July 20, 1993) (statement of Sen. 
Robert Dole); 139 CONG. REC. S 8,881 (daily ed. July 16, 1993) (statement of Sen. 
Edward Kennedy); H.R. 20 (103rd): Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 1993, 
GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/103-1993/h437 (last visited Feb. 
16, 2015). 
 173. See Congress Profiles: 103rd Congress (1993–1995), U.S. HOUSE 
REPRESENTATIVES, http://history.house.gov/Congressional-Overview/Profiles/103rd/ 
(last visited Feb. 16, 2015). 
 174. See Remarks on Signing the Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 1993, supra 
note 1. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Josh Gerstein, Carolyn Lerner, Hatch Act Enforcer, Seeks Reforms, 
POLITICO (Oct. 6, 2011, 7:04 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1011/
65374.html. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See Anthony T. Kovalchick, Ending the Suppression: Why the Hatch Act 
Cannot Withstand Meaningful Constitutional Scrutiny, 30 W. NEW. ENG. L. REV. 419, 
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offices are staffed through partisan elections.179  One of the most 
frequently cited examples of this issue is the election of a local sheriff, 
where the most obvious and qualified candidates for office include 
members of the police force, who frequently receive federal grants, 
subjecting them to Hatch Act coverage.180  Jason C. Miller put forth 
another criticism, which was echoed by Carolyn N. Lerner, the head 
of the OSC.  Miller and Lerner argue that the provisions claim that 
the broad prohibition against “Hatch Act-covered” state and local 
employees running for partisan political office creates a disparate 
impact and unfavorable consequences.181 
Another major criticism of HARA is that the penalty provisions 
were unworkable as written.  Kathleen Clark, an expert in legal ethics 
and a law professor at Washington University in St. Louis, criticized 
the lack of options for the penalty provisions when a federal 
employee violates the Act.182  The old penalty provisions were so 
“draconian” that they discouraged reporting.183  The choice between 
																																																																																																																																
421 (2008) (“This attempt by incumbents to insulate themselves from electoral 
challenges from government employees has gone virtually unnoticed by many 
Americans.  Nevertheless, the time has come for the Hatch Act to be exposed for the 
incumbent-protectionist sham that it is.”). 
 179. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 18, at 329. 
 180. Id. at 321–22.  The unique position of law enforcement is discussed further in 
Part II.D.  As a position in law enforcement frequently requires the officer to 
constantly be in uniform, certain provisions disparately affect them.  For example, if 
an officer used a police dog received through a federal grant, that officer would be 
prevented from running for a partisan sheriff election. See id.; infra, Part II.D. 
 181. Carolyn N. Lerner, A Law Misused for Political Ends, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/31/opinion/the-hatch-act-a-law-misused.html; 
see also Miller, supra note 18, at 329.  In his article, Miller states that “[t]he Hatch 
Act’s vagueness and the confusion it causes may have a chilling effect even on 
employees who are not covered because they do not understand the exceptions.  
These exceptions demonstrate how absurd the Hatch Act is.” Miller, supra note 18, at 
329.  He further explains how certain positions, such as Mayor of Detroit, are non-
partisan, while other positions, such as township trustee of a small town in Michigan, 
are partisan. Id.  Similarly, “a covered employee cannot run for the Michigan 
Supreme Court, where the presumption of nonpartisanship is rebutted, but can run 
for the Michigan Court of Appeals, where the presumption of nonpartisanship would 
hold up.” Id.  These are only a few examples of the disparity in applicability to 
covered employees.  In addition, Miller attempts to leverage federalism arguments in 
support of additional reforms.  “Even if the Hatch Act does not violate the Tenth 
Amendment, the state and local government provisions inherently raise problems.  
‘The regulation of the political activity of state and local government by the federal 
government was never a good idea.’” Id. at 328.  This Note will not discuss federalism 
at length. 
 182. Eileen Ambrose, Campaign Rules for Federal Employees Get an Update, 
BALT. SUN, Jan. 27, 2013, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-01-27/news/bs-md-
federal-hatch-20130127_1_hatch-act-federal-employees-government-employees/2. 
 183. Id. 
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suspension of no less than thirty days or termination does not leave 
much room for minor, first-time offenses the way a fine or reduction 
in grade might.184 
G. The Hatch Act Modernization Act of 2012 
In an editorial, Lerner discussed the reasons for proposing the 
changes that would eventually become HAMA: 
[A]t its worst, the law prevents would-be candidates in state and 
local races from running because they are in some way, no matter 
how trivially, tied to a source of federal funds in their professional 
lives.  Our caseload in these matters quintupled to 526 complaints in 
the 2010 fiscal year, from 98 in 2000.  We advised individuals on this 
law 4,320 times in 2010.185 
Lerner’s statement resonated soundly with Miller and Clark’s 
dismay at the effects of the Hatch Act on state and local elections.186  
Co-sponsors Senator Joseph Lieberman, Senator Carl Levin, and 
Senator Mike Lee introduced HAMA in the Senate on March 7, 
2012.187  The bill passed in the Senate on November 30, 2012, and it 
passed in the House of Representatives on December 19, 2012.188  
President Barack Obama signed it into law on December 28, 2012.189  
HAMA further limited the Hatch Act’s historically broad application 
to state and local employees by lifting restrictions on running for 
office and expanding the penalty provisions for federal employees.190  
These changes went into effect on January 28, 2013.191  Support for 
																																																																																																																																
 184. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1505, 1506, 1508 (2012); 5 U.S.C. § 7326 (2012). 
 185. Lerner, supra note 181. 
 186. Miller, supra note 18, at 329. 
 187. S.2170—Hatch Act Modernization Act of 2012: Cosponsors, CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://beta.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/senate-bill/2170/cosponsors (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2015). 
 188. S.2170—Hatch Act Modernization Act of 2012: Actions, CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://beta.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/senate-bill/2170/actions (last visited Feb. 
16, 2015). 
 189. Id. 
 190. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501–08 (Supp. 2013); 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321–26 (Supp. 2013).  
Additionally, HAMA provided exceptions to D.C. employees who were previously 
covered under the federal Hatch Act and permitted federal employees more latitude 
in becoming involved in D.C. city politics. See Tim Craig, City, Federal Employees in 
D.C. Face Revised Hatch Act, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 2013, http://www.washington
post.com/blogs/dc-wire/post/city-federal-employees-in-dc-face-revised-hatch-act/
2013/01/09/1a10a3d8-5a98-11e2-9fa9-5fbdc9530eb9_blog.html. 
 191. See Craig, supra note 190. 
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HAMA’s passage stemmed from criticisms by lawmakers, academics, 
and officials within the OSC alike.192 
1. Effects of HAMA on Federal Employees 
The primary reform provision applicable to federal employees 
under HAMA was a change in the penalty provisions, which allowed 
for suspension of no less than thirty days or termination.193  The 
definition of a covered federal employee did not change.194  Under 
HAMA, a final order from the MSPB for an employee may now 
impose: 
(i) disciplinary action consisting of removal, reduction in grade, 
debarment from Federal employment for a period not to exceed 5 
years, suspension, or reprimand; (ii) an assessment of a civil penalty 
not to exceed $1,000; or (iii) any combination of disciplinary actions 
described under clause (i) and an assessment described under clause 
(ii).195 
Some experts, like Clark, have praised the new penalties, arguing 
that the previous penalties were the “death penalty to your federal 
career” and that now the “standards are more likely to be enforced 
because the penalty is not absurd.”196  The new penalty provisions 
provide a range of penalties that now may be assessed against the 
severity and frequency of the violation.197 
2. Effects of HAMA on State Employees 
Under HAMA, the prohibitions against running for partisan office 
for state and local employees apply only to employees whose salaries 
are funded in their entirety by the federal government.198  This change 
																																																																																																																																
 192. See, e.g., Ambrose, supra note 182; Lerner, supra note 181. 
 193. Ambrose, supra note 182. 
 194. Hatch Act Frequently Asked Questions: Federal Employees, U.S. OFFICE 
SPECIAL COUNSEL, https://osc.gov/pages/hatchact-affectsme.aspx (select “I am a 
Federal Employee”; then follow “IV.” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 16, 2015) 
[hereinafter Federal Employees FAQs] (“For purposes of the Hatch Act, the term 
federal ‘employee’ means any individual, other than the President and the Vice 
President, employed or holding office in one of the following: 1) an Executive agency 
other than the General Accounting Office; or 2) a position within the competitive 
service which is not an executive agency; Additionally, under the Hatch Act the term 
federal employee does not include a member of the uniformed services or an 
individual employed or holding office in the government of the District of 
Columbia.”). 
 195. 5 U.S.C. § 1215 (Supp. 2013). 
 196. Ambrose, supra note 182. 
 197. Id. 
 198. 5 U.S.C. § 1502(a)(3) (Supp. 2013). 
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means that “Hatch Act-covered” state and local employees may now 
run for partisan office so long as their salaries are only partially 
funded by the federal government.199  To illustrate the number of 
state and local employees affected by this change, nearly 10,000 of 
New York State’s over 200,000 employees200 have salaries that are 
funded in whole or in part by federal funds.201  As most funds are 
allocated to agencies as a whole, it is unlikely that any one employee 
would be fully federally funded, with the exception of a select few 
specialized law enforcement personnel whose positions are created or 
fully funded by a federal grant.202  Therefore, for nearly every state 
and local employee, the prohibition against running for partisan 
political office is now lifted. 
HAMA’s passage addressed many of the criticisms of HARA 
because it removed what had been referred to as an “incumbent 
protection device.”203  The reforms also made the provisions relating 
to state and local employees applicable to employees of the District of 
																																																																																																																																
 199. See § 1502; Covered State and Local Employees, supra note 9. 
 200. As of 2011, New York State had 226,662 full-time employees. 2011 Public 
Employment and Payroll Data, CENSUS.GOV, http://www2.census.gov/govs/apes/
11stny.txt. 
 201. Tom Precious, N.Y. State Employees Funded by U.S. Avoid Immediate 
Furlough, BUFFALO NEWS, Oct. 1, 2013, http://www.buffalonews.com/city-region/
albany-politics/ny-state-employees-funded-by-us-avoid-immediate-furlough-
20131001; see also Michael Cooper, States Fear Local Effects if Shutdown Cuts Off 
Cash, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/06/us/06states.html 
(stating that, “in 1995, Maryland spent $1.4 million a day to keep its federally paid 
employees at work,” and that “Massachusetts estimates that it has roughly 4500 full-
time workers who are paid from various federal sources”). 
 202. For an example of an instance where such positions might exist, see Peter 
Goonan, Springfield Police to Use $1 Million Justice Department Grant to Combat 
Crime in South End, MASSLIVE (Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.masslive.com/news/
index.ssf/2013/10/springfield_police_will_use_1.html.  For example, if they create new 
units or positions pursuant to the grant, these positions may be covered. See 
Congress Repeals Restriction on Fire Fighters Running for Political Office, IIAF 
(Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.iaff.org/12News/122012Congress.htm (“While [HAMA] 
is an important step in expanding the ability of fire fighters to participate in the 
political process, there are still other barriers in the way of IAFF members who want 
to serve their communities as elected officials.  The Hatch Act Modernization Act 
applies only to state and municipal employees.  Federal fire fighters remain covered 
by other sections of the Hatch Act, and are still barred from many types of political 
activity.  Also, the prohibition on municipal employees running for office remains in 
effect for those employees whose salary is paid entirely by federal funds.  Therefore, 
any fire fighter whose salary comes solely from a Staffing for Adequate Fire and 
Emergency Response (SAFER) grant would not be eligible to run until the grant 
expires.”). 
 203. By preventing many state and local employees from running for public office, 
thereby decreasing the pool of potential opponents, the Act can be seen as protecting 
incumbents. See Ambrose, supra note 182. 
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Columbia as well.204  However, unlike the changes to the penalty 
provisions for federal employees under HAMA, the penalty for state 
employees remains the same.205  These penalty provisions still only 
provide the options of termination and non-termination.206  While 
significant changes were made to the partisan office provision, all 
other prohibitions under the Hatch Act remain in force for all state 
and local employees who work in connection with programs that 
receive federal funds.207  Therefore, state and local employees who 
were “Hatch Act-covered” employees before HAMA are still 
covered by the provisions prohibiting the use of official authority or 
influence to interfere with an election or nomination and the coercion 
or direction of employees to make contributions to any group for 
political purposes.208 
H. “Little Hatch Acts” 
While the federal government has relinquished much of its control 
over whether certain state and local employees may run in partisan 
political elections, the states still maintain their own interest in 
regulating the political activities of their employees.209  The OSC 
asserts that “Little Hatch Acts,” still apply to employees exempt from 
the Hatch Act’s prohibitions, and that such employees must look to 
state prohibitions to determine whether they are in violation (noting 
that states may impose more rigid standards if they so choose).210  
However, not all states have the same policy regarding what is 
proscribed as far as political activities and speech of public 
employees, and which public employees are included under the 
statute.211  The OSC has already faced questions about the 
applicability of HAMA to pending cases; however, the 
constitutionality of the new law has yet to face a legal challenge.212 
A major question remains as to whether these agencies can and 
should retain their current policies if they were closer to the original 
																																																																																																																																
 204. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501(2), 1501(4), 1502(c)(3), 1506(a)(2) (Supp. 2013). 
 205. See § 1506; 5 U.S.C § 1215 (2014). 
 206. § 1506. 
 207. See Covered State and Local Employees, supra note 9. 
 208. Id. 
 209. HAMA Guidance, supra note 115. 
 210. Id. 
 211. See, e.g., Rafael Gely & Timothy D. Chandler, Restricting Public Employees’ 
Political Activities: Good Government or Partisan Politics?, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 775, 
791–96 (2000); infra Part II.A. 
 212. Special Counsel v. Greiner held that the HAMA would not be applied 
retroactively. 119 M.S.P.R. 492, 495 (2013). 
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Hatch Act requirements, where state political activities law is less 
stringent than the Hatch Act.213  The OSC reports that new 
complaints received decreased from 503 in 2012 to 277 in 2013, and 
advisory opinions decreased from 3448 to 1767.214  While the effects 
on the number of complaints post-HAMA have dropped significantly, 
it is too early to discern whether the precipitous drop will be 
permanent, especially considering that the number of new complaints 
was as low as 282 in 2007.215  It is still unclear which of the HAMA 
reforms—the federal penalty provisions or the loosening of the 
restrictions on state and local employees—had more of an impact on 
the number of complaints.216 
1. Comparing Different “Little Hatch Acts” 
Individual states have adopted a wide variety of regulations 
modeled after provisions of the Hatch Act, which apply to state and 
local employees.217  In 2000, Professor Rafael Gely of University of 
Cincinnati College of Law and Professor Thomas D. Chandler of 
Louisiana State University organized a study of all the states that 
have enacted “Little Hatch Acts.”218  They found that thirty-one states 
have adopted less restrictive statutes.219  Of the less restrictive states, 
nine220 have adopted restrictions in at least three of the areas 
prohibited under the Hatch Act, fourteen221 have adopted at least two 
of the prohibitions, and eight222 have adopted only one of the 
prohibitions.223  In total, twenty-three states bar employees from 
solicitation of contributions or support for a campaign, thirteen states 
																																																																																																																																
 213. See infra Part III (suggesting how states might proceed). 
 214. U.S. OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR 
FISCAL YEAR 2013 30 (2013), available at https://osc.gov/Resources/6%2027%2014
%20ANNUAL%20REPORT.pdf. 
 215. Id. 
 216. See id.  The report does not detail the nature of the complaints. 
 217. See generally Gely & Chandler, supra note 211. 
 218. Id. 
 219. See id. at 795. 
 220. The nine states are Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Kansas, Maine, 
Massachusetts, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas. See id. at 792.  All of these 
states “prohibit the providing or soliciting of financial or manpower contributions to 
political organizations or political candidates.” Id. at 795. 
 221. The fourteen states are California, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Maryland, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, Rhode Island, Utah, Washington, and 
Wisconsin. Id. at 792.  Ten of these states regulate the solicitation of campaign 
contributions. Id. at 795. 
 222. The eight states are Illinois, Indiana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
North Dakota, Oregon, and South Carolina. Id. at 792. 
 223. Id. at 795. 
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bar holding elected positions, and twenty-two states bar participation 
in political activities at work, in uniform, or on government 
property.224 
However, four states225 go beyond the Hatch Act’s226 provisions for 
state and local employees, barring employees from taking an active 
part in political campaigning as well as direct participation in partisan 
elections.227  Two states bar covered employees from taking part “in 
the management of the affairs of a political party . . . or any political 
campaign,”228 and two bar covered employees from “becoming 
members or officers of political parties.”229  This survey reveals that 
when states consider which activities to restrict, campaign 
contributions and political activity while on duty are the most 
important, followed by holding elected positions.230 
Adding to the confusion caused by the states’ varying 
implementation of “Little Hatch Act” provisions is the trend of 
judicial review to loosen such provisions.  For example in Pinto v. 
State Civil Service Commission, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
examined whether a corrections officer taking a leave of absence to 
serve as the Vice President of the Pennsylvania State Corrections 
Officers Association was subject to the Civil Service Act.231  The Civil 
Service Act prohibited: 
[T]aking an active part in political management or in a political 
campaign.  Activities prohibited by this subsection include, but are 
not limited to, the following activities: . . . Soliciting votes in support 
of or in opposition to a candidate for public office in a partisan 
																																																																																																																																
 224. Id. at 792. 
 225. Gely and Chandler studied thirty-five states’ “Little Hatch Acts.” Id. at 791. 
 226. It is important to note that this study was performed before HAMA and 
examined the Hatch Act as amended in 1993.  For information on the 1993 
amendments, which loosened restrictions on political management, see supra Part 
I.F. 
 227. Gely & Chandler, supra note 211, at 794. 
 228. Id. (citing LA. CONST. art. X, § 9(A); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 124.57(A) 
(Anderson Supp. 1999) (barring Ohio employees from taking “part in politics other 
than to vote as the . . . employee pleases.”)). 
 229. Id. (citing W. VA. CODE § 29-6-20(e)(3) (Michie 1999) (allowing West Virginia 
employees to participate in “[o]ther types of partisan or nonpartisan political 
campaigning and management not inconsistent with the provisions of this 
subdivision” and stating that “no employee in the classified service shall . . . be a 
candidate or delegate to any state or national political party convention, [or] a 
member of any national, state or local committee of a political party.”); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 10-9-21(B) (Michie 1995) (prohibiting New Mexico’s covered public 
employees from becoming officers of a political organization)). 
 230. See id. at 795. 
 231. 912 A.2d 787 (Pa. 2006). 
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election or a candidate for political party office . . . .  Endorsing or 
opposing a candidate for public office in a partisan election or a 
candidate for political party office in a political advertisement, a 
broadcast, campaign, literature, or similar material.232 
The court’s analysis relied upon the State Employee Retirement 
Code, which provided for statewide employee organizations to 
reimburse employers for “[a]n active member on paid leave granted 
by an employer for purposes of serving as an elected full-time officer 
for a Statewide employee organization which is a collective 
bargaining representative under the [Public Employee Relations] 
Act.”233  Moreover, Commission Rule 103.11(b), which made an 
exception from the Civil Service Act for those who “who [are] on a 
regular leave of absence, or leave of absence to take a non[-]civil 
service position.”234  Relying on the language of these regulations, the 
court held that the officer was exempt from the state Civil Service Act 
because the leave of absence was to take a non-civil service position, 
thus loosening the interpretation of the political activities provision.235 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, meanwhile, held in 
Callaghan v. City of South Portland that a particular prohibition on 
City of South Portland employees violated the First Amendment 
rights of two part-time employees who had previously served on the 
school board before the statute’s passage.236  The provision in 
question prohibited any City employee from: “(1) seeking election to 
or serving on the South Portland School Board; and (2) engaging in 
certain political activities on their own time, specifically circulating 
petitions or campaign literature in connection with School Board 
elections, and soliciting or receiving contributions or political service 
for or against candidates in School Board elections.”237  The court 
held that the City failed to demonstrate a “necessary impact on the 
actual operation of the Government,” school sufficient to outweigh 
the employees’ First Amendment interests in running in the School 
Board election.238  The court also rejected claims that the case should 
be evaluated like other Hatch Act cases because the City’s candidacy 
restriction in the nonpartisan School Board elections was more 
																																																																																																																																
 232. 71 PA. CONS. STAT. § 741.905b (2012). 
 233. 71 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5302(b)(2) (2012). 
 234. 4 PA. CODE § 103.11(b) (2014). 
 235. Pinto, 912 A.2d at 794. 
 236. 76 A.3d 348, 349–50 (Me. 2013). 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 357 (citing United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emp. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 
468 (1995)). 
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restrictive than Maine’s “Little Hatch Act.”239  Maine’s “Little Hatch 
Act” not only allows state employees to run as “a candidate for public 
office in a nonpartisan election,”240 but also allows candidacy in a 
partisan election for a local office.241 
Additionally, the Eighth Circuit held in Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White that a Minnesota statute’s partisan activities 
limitation violated judges’ freedom of association rights, and the 
statute’s solicitation clause violated judges’ First Amendment 
rights.242  The court held that the political-activities clause did not 
survive strict scrutiny, reasoning that, because the law restricted 
activities related to political parties and not other interest groups, the 
law was under-inclusive as to its stated interest and therefore it was 
not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.243  While 
several jurisdictions have addressed the validity of particular 
regulations, it is as of yet unclear what the true limitations are on 
state and local political-activities laws. 
The jurisprudence surrounding state and local political activities 
laws informs an analysis of the constitutionality of “Little Hatch 
Acts” and illustrates the potential boundaries of state and local 
regulations.  The aforementioned cases may be interpreted to further 
the position that states should interpret political activities policies 
narrowly, as seen in Pinto, or, alternatively, that they violate the First 
Amendment, as seen in Callaghan and White.244  Interestingly, the 
Eighth Circuit draws a line in Callaghan where a local regulation is 
more restrictive than the state and federal regulations.245  With no 
uniform rule regarding the extent to which state and local political 
activities laws may regulate public employees, there is the potential 
																																																																																																																																
 239. Id. at 355. 
 240. 5 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 7056-A(6)(D) (West 2014). 
 241. Id. § 7056–A(4). 
 242. 416 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2005).  This case was heard on remand en banc after the 
Supreme Court held that “the Minnesota Supreme Court’s canon of judicial conduct 
prohibiting candidates for judicial election from announcing their views on disputed 
legal and political issues violates the First Amendment.” Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002).  The Supreme Court did not reach the 
issues of the political activities clause in MINN. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, 
Canon 5(A)(1)(a), (d), 5(B)(1)(a) (2000), or the solicitation clause in MINN. CODE 
JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 5(B)(2) (2000). 
 243. White, 416 F.3d at 751–56. 
 244. See White, 416 F.3d 738; Callaghan, 76 A.3d at 349–50; Pinto v. State Civil 
Serv. Comm’n, 912 A.2d 787 (Pa. 2006). 
 245. See Callaghan, 76 A.3d at 355. 
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for conflicting case law on the validity of over-inclusive regulations.246  
Such uncertainty poses an issue for both those drafting state and local 
political activities regulations and those interpreting them. 
Furthermore, the judicial interpretations of “Little Hatch Acts” 
differ from judicial interpretations of the federal Hatch Act.247  The 
interpretations that political activities policies interfere with 
employees’ First Amendment rights in Callaghan and White conflict 
with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal Hatch Act as 
seen in Letter Carriers and Mitchell.248  Federal case law has thus far 
found no conflict between provisions barring partisan political 
activities and largely has deferred to the government’s interest in 
regulating its own employees.249  While there is no direct conflict in 
the interpretation of state and federal provisions, as they remain 
distinct laws, the disparate interpretation of the political activities 
provisions heightens the potential for confusion.250 
2. The Constitutionality of “Little Hatch Acts” 
Just as it upheld the original Hatch Act in 1939, the Supreme Court 
has upheld the constitutionality of “Little Hatch Acts” and their 
application to classified service employees.251  In Broadrick v. 
																																																																																																																																
 246. Bauer v. Shepard declined to follow White and held that an Indiana judicial 
conduct rule limiting the political activities of Indiana’s judges did not violate the 
First Amendment. 620 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 2010).  In Mancuso v. Taft, the First Circuit 
likewise affirmed the District Court’s holding that a city charter that barred 
nonpartisan candidacy violated the First Amendment and held that it violated the 
equal protection clause. 476 F.2d 187, 200 (1st Cir. 1973).  However, in Magill v. 
Lynch the First Circuit weakened its Mancuso v. Taft position on regulations barring 
nonpartisan candidacy, stating “the government may constitutionally restrict its 
employees’ participation in nominally nonpartisan elections if political parties play a 
large role in the campaigns.” 560 F.2d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 1977).  The First Circuit vacated 
an order granting a permanent injunction against the enforcement of a city provision 
barring a broad range of political activities, including running for nonpartisan office, 
and remanded to the District Court to perform an over breadth analysis. Id. at 22.  In 
addition, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that a statute barring state employees 
from holding any paid, elected public office, even a nonpartisan position, did not 
violate state employees’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Fernandez v. State 
Pers. Bd., 852 P.2d 1223 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992). 
 247. Compare Callaghan, 76 A.3d at 349–50, and White, 416 F.3d 738, with U.S. 
Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 556 (1973). 
 248. See generally Callaghan, 76 A.3d 348; White, 416 F.3d 738. 
 249. See Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 556. 
 250. This is because state and federal policies do not preempt each other. 
 251. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 601 (1973). 
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Oklahoma,252 the Supreme Court held that a state statute forbidding 
political activities of state employees does not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.253  Petitioners 
argued that the Equal Protection Clause was violated because the 
political activities law applied to classified service employees and not 
unclassified service employees.  They also argued that the statute was 
unconstitutionally vague.254  The Court disagreed, holding that the 
statute was not impermissibly vague in forbidding state employees 
from soliciting contributions “for any political organization, 
candidacy or other political purpose,” from being a member of “any 
national, state or local committee of a political party,” or from being 
“an officer or member of a committee or a partisan political club.”255  
The provision forbidding state employees from being “a candidate for 
nomination or election to any paid public office,” or from “tak[ing] 
part in the management or affairs of any political party or in any 
political campaign” was likewise upheld.256  Under this decision, the 
Court opined that the only truly protected political activity was the 
right to privately express one’s opinion and vote.257 
Acknowledging the potential for the political activities law to chill 
protected speech,258 the Court ultimately rejected the argument that 
the statute should be discarded because some “arguably protected 
conduct may or may not be caught or chilled by the statute.”259  While 
a broadly-worded political activity law may chill protected speech to a 
degree, the Court asserted, it cannot be said with confidence that such 
a chilling effect would be sufficient to justify striking the statute and 
barring the State from enforcing the statute against “conduct that is 
admittedly within its power to proscribe.”260  The Court’s holding that 
“Little Hatch Acts” are constitutional despite their potential to chill 
protected speech remains the controlling rule of law; however, it must 
be noted that some states’ highest courts and Circuit Courts have 
																																																																																																																																
 252. Broadrick is the principal case addressing the constitutionality of “Little 
Hatch Acts”; however, see supra Part I.H.1 for a discussion of state and circuit court 
opinions on the “Little Hatch Acts” and the First Amendment. 
 253. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 601. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. at 618 (stating that some restrictions may be susceptible to improper 
applications by restricting protected activities such as “the wearing of political 
buttons or the use of bumper stickers”). 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. at 615. 
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found provisions of “Little Hatch Acts” to violate the First 
Amendment.261 
II.  POST-HAMA, RIGID, INFLEXIBLE RESULTS REMAIN DUE TO 
THE HATCH ACT’S DISPARATE APPLICATION AND LACK OF 
GUIDANCE 
HAMA made a number of changes to the Hatch Act that benefit 
proponents of free speech and open political discourse.  However, 
HAMA removed prohibitions that had already been incorporated 
into agency employee policies and state regulations.262  Even after 
HAMA, the differences between state, federal, and local agency 
approaches to prohibitions on certain political discourse are sufficient 
to maintain confusion over whether or not certain employees may or 
may not participate in political activities and when they may do so.263  
Furthermore, HAMA does not provide guidance for bi- and multi-
state government agencies.264  Additionally, HAMA still has not 
addressed the rigid penalty provisions that result in inconsistent 
enforcement of the Hatch Act at the state level. 
A. Confusion Over Applicable Regulations Deters Political 
Participation 
While the changes enacted by HAMA addressed the concerns 
raised by critics of the Hatch Act and proponents of the bill,265 further 
action is needed to effectuate the purposes of HAMA.  The passage 
of HAMA indicates that Congress recognized the decreased need for 
government regulation of the political speech of government 
employees.  However, HAMA lacks a mechanism for decreasing the 
confusion caused by overlapping prohibitions and disparate state 
regulations.  When confronted with uncertainty regarding the Hatch 
Act’s application, employees may choose to pull out or question their 
																																																																																																																																
 261. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2005); 
Callaghan v. City of S. Portland, 76 A.3d 348, 349–50 (Me. 2013). 
 262. THE PORT AUTH. OF N.Y. & N.J., SERVING IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE 
GUIDE TO PORT AUTHORITY ETHICAL STANDARDS (2000), available at http://
www.panynj.gov/corporate-information/foi/13255-O.pdf.  An example of this can be 
found in my discussion of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey’s political 
activities rules. See infra Part II.B; see also Gely & Chandler, supra note 211, at 795 
(discussing “Little Hatch Acts” that bar holding elected positions). 
 263. See Michael O’Connell, Are You Violating the Hatch Act and You Don’t 
Even Know It?, FED. NEWS RADIO (May 20, 2014, 4:23 PM), http://www.federalnews
radio.com/?nid=521&sid=3623987&pid=0&page=2. 
 264. See infra Part II.B. 
 265. See supra Part I.G.1–2. 
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candidacy, thereby reducing the number of potential candidates for 
political office as well as political participation by a wide variety of 
government employees.266 
1. Disparate State Regulations. 
Differences in the regulations enacted by multiple states contribute 
to overall confusion and a reduction of valuable political discourse.  A 
2007 survey of state “Little Hatch Acts” revealed that most workers 
in senior management and officials in state government believed that 
employees knew that the state laws existed but did not necessarily 
understand their application.267  While some states268 train their 
employees about the Hatch Act, others do not.269  Additionally, as 
“enforcement authority, which itself varies from state to state, is often 
fragmented among several agencies, commissions, and offices,”270 
there is a great degree of variation in the awareness and 
understanding of employees regarding their ability to run for office.  
The survey found that sixty-two percent doubt that “confusion over 
the provisions of the [Little] Hatch Act has a ‘chilling’ effect that 
reduces participation in democracy.”271  However, the authors of the 
study caution that it would be unwise to disregard the significance of 
those who disagree, and argue that “there is room for concern if a 
substantial minority of the workforce does not know the law.”272 
There was also significant disagreement as to whether “the original 
purpose of the law—to protect civil servants from partisan coercion 
and to protect the public from political administration of the law—has 
been fulfilled.”273  It is undeniable that public understanding of “Little 
Hatch Acts” and the actual effectiveness of the acts at fulfilling their 
intended purpose are less than ideal.274  Additionally, individual state 
agencies may interpret perceived Hatch Act violations differently and 
																																																																																																																																
 266. See, e.g., Scot Andrew Pitzer & Jarrad Hedes, Hatch Act Questions Plague 
DJ Race, GETTYSBURG TIMES, Aug. 1, 2011, http://www.gettysburgtimes.com/news/
article_71131f0c-7b70-11e0-a987-001cc4c03286.html?Mode=jqm. 
 267. See Bowman & West, supra note 4, at 28–30. 
 268. Such states include Massachusetts, Nebraska, North Carolina, and Oregon. Id. 
at 28. 
 269. Such states include Maine, Minnesota, Georgia, and Michigan. Id. at 28. 
 270. Id. at 28. 
 271. Id. at 29. 
 272. Id. at 28. 
 273. Id. at 31.  Bowman and West note that “most managers are either uncertain 
(19%) or disagree (38%)” as to whether the original purpose is fulfilled. 
 274. See id. 
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consider such acts in personnel decisions.275  The Utah Supreme Court 
held that the “Hatch Act did not preempt state law, and thus the 
Department could voluntarily comply with the Act by making 
independent personnel decisions based on employee’s violation of the 
Act.”276  Such responses have the potential to chill and confuse 
employees. 
2. Overlapping Prohibitions: The Uniform Code of Military Justice 
Confusion regarding the Act’s current application to military 
personnel provides an analogous context in which free speech may be 
stifled.  Military personnel are often confused as to which statutory 
prohibitions against political participation apply to them.277  They 
might be covered by the Hatch Act, their respective state’s “Little 
Hatch Act,” the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), and/or 
Department of Defense Directives (DODD).  Compounding the 
confusion are exceptions to the Hatch Act’s typical scope.  For 
example, the Hatch Act does not apply to military personnel on 
active duty; the UCMJ applies to active military members; and the 
DODD applies various restrictions to specific employees.278  
However, while the Hatch Act does not cover military personnel on 
active duty,279 there is rampant misinformation in media reporting 
regarding which military personnel are covered by the Hatch Act and 
the UCMJ/DODD, and what these regulations actually prohibit. 
For instance, RedFlagNews.com reported a story with the headline: 
“TERRIFYING! Soldiers Donating to Tea Party Now Face 
Punishment Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.”280  The 
website continued to broadcast that two anonymous soldiers had been 
told during a pre-deployment briefing at Fort Hood that soldiers 
donating to evangelical Christian groups and members of the Tea 
Party would be subject to punishment because members of those 
groups were a threat to the nation.281  The story was reported to a 
																																																																																																																																
 275. See Utah Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Hughes, 156 P.3d 820 (Utah 2007). 
 276. Id. 
 277. See Federal Employees FAQs, supra note 194. 
 278. “Members of the uniformed services are not covered by the Hatch Act.  
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the Hatch Act.” Federal Employees FAQ, supra note 194. 
 279. Id. 
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larger audience on FoxNews.com, yet the claims could not be 
substantiated after a preliminary investigation.282  However, just as 
confusion over the Hatch Act’s proper scope still exists, continued 
belief in the possibility of coverage for active military personnel may 
still exist without widespread clarifications. 
In response to the RedFlagNews.com article, Department of 
Defense spokesman Lt. Col. J. Todd Breasseale stated “it’s also a 
kind of un American potentially dangerous fear mongering . . . . 
Service members may donate to any legal cause they choose . . . as 
long as they do so within the boundaries of the Hatch Act . . . .”283  
Breasseale added that members of the military are permitted to 
participate in the political process as long as they do so out of 
uniform, off duty, and without any implication of government 
endorsement.284  Members of the military do face limits on political 
activities; these regulations are in line with the Hatch Act in 
preventing the appearance of Department of Defense endorsement of 
candidates.285  Under the Hatch Act, there are no restrictions to 
donating to political organizations.286  Such incidents of 
misinformation surrounding the potential application of multiple 
regulations to one employee exemplify the unresolved issues with the 
public’s understanding of the Hatch Act and other political activities 
laws.287  The public understanding of the intended purpose of the 
Hatch Act not only affects the activities of government employees, 
but it likewise has an impact on the public perception and scrutiny 
applied to government employees.288 
																																																																																																																																
 282. Id. 
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Meanwhile, Articles 88 and 133 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice cover 
contemptuous language to the President or other officers and conduct unbecoming of 
an officer, respectively. John Loran Kiel, Jr., When Soldiers Speak Out: A Survey of 
Provisions Limiting Freedom of Speech in the Military, PARAMETERS Autumn 2007, 
at 69, 71–76, http://cape.army.mil/repository/materials/WhenSoldiersSpeakOut.pdf. 
 286. Emery Jr., supra note 280. 
 287. See id. 
 288. See, e.g., Dave Helling, Furlough Adds to the Anguish for Federal Workers, 
KANSAS CITY STAR, Oct. 05, 2013, http://www.kansascity.com/2013/10/05/4531641/
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B. Lack of Guidance for Bi- and Multi-State Agencies Results 
in Broad Prohibitions 
Bi- and multi-state agencies are uniquely affected by the changes 
that come along with HAMA.  Since HAMA, the Hatch Act does not 
apply to the employees of bi- or multi-state agencies unless the 
employees’ salaries are fully funded by federal grants or loans.289  
However, state regulations frequently do not apply to bi-state or 
multi-state agencies either.290  Therefore, many agencies must 
maintain their own internal policies.291  Moreover, bi- and multi-state 
agencies fall outside the purview of both state and federal regulation 
unless the states included in the compact forming the agency have 
passed identical legislation.292 
Two notable cases illustrate the principle that concurrent, identical 
legislation is necessary to bind a bi- or multi-state agency.  First, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court in Eastern Paralyzed Veterans 
Association v. City of Camden illustrated this principle.293  In Eastern 
Paralyzed Veterans, the court held that “only when the compact itself 
recognizes the jurisdiction of the compact states may it be subject to 
single state jurisdiction.”294  Secondly, King v. Port Authority of New 
York and New Jersey illustrated that it is difficult to pass legislation 
with the cooperation of two state legislatures, even in instances where 
the laws of two states are very similar.295  In that case, the District of 
New Jersey held that “when the compact states have similar, but not 
																																																																																																																																
Scandals involving employees at the Internal Revenue Service, the Justice 
Department, even the Secret Service reinforce the poor public perception of 
federal workers.  But federal employees say the images severely distort the 
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Paralyzed Veterans Ass’n v. City of Camden, 545 A.2d 127 (N.J. 1988). 
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identical laws, the laws only apply to the bi-state agency upon an 
explicit showing of agreement by both states that the laws are 
intended to apply to the agency.”296  The court explained that to allow 
a single state’s law to apply to the agency would mean allowing one 
state to affect the operation of a bi-state agency, thereby “forcing 
upon it additional duties or responsibilities.”297  Regardless of the 
reasoning, the end result is a large degree of unpredictability 
regarding the applicable law. 
Even where states enact identical legislation, bi-state and multi-
state agencies might still fall outside the provisions of their “Little 
Hatch Acts.”  For instance, New York’s298 Public Officers Law, which 
sets out the ethics laws for state employees, defines “state officer[s] or 
employee[s]” as “members or directors of public authorities, other 
than multi-state authorities, public benefit corporations and 
commissions at least one of whose members is appointed by the 
governor, who receive compensation other than on a per diem basis, 
and employees of such authorities, corporations and commissions.”299  
The New York State Joint Commission on Public Ethics is tasked 
with the investigation of potential violations of New York’s “Little 
Hatch Act.”300  Executive Law Section 94, which established the Joint 
Commission, sets forth the duties of the commission as carrying out 
the duties set forth in the section (including carrying out the Civil 
Service Law) with respect to elected officials, state employees and 
officials as defined by Public Officers Law Sections 73 and 73-a, and 
various other individuals.301  This definition, in conjunction with 
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government employees.  New York, California, and Texas are the three states with 
the largest numbers of state and local government employees (all exceeding one 
million).  In March 2012, New York had 1,326,990 state and local employees, 79.2% 
of which were local employees. Lisa Jessie & Mary Tarleton, 2012 Census of 
Governments: Employment Summary Report, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 6, 2014), 
http://www2.census.gov/govs/apes/2012_summary_report.pdf. 
 299. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 73(1)(i)(iv) (McKinney 2012). 
 300. Tips and Complaints, N.Y. ST. JOINT COMMISSION ON PUB. ETHICS, 
http://www.jcope.ny.gov/complaint/tipsandcomplaints.html (last visited Feb. 16, 
2015).  New York’s “Little Hatch Act” is codified in Civil Service Law § 107. N.Y. 
CIV. SERV. LAW § 107 (McKinney 2007).  The commission is also tasked with 
investigating potential violations of the Lobbying Act (codified in N.Y. LEGIS. LAW 
art. 1-A (McKinney 2007)) and New York’s ethics laws (codified in N.Y. PUB. OFF. 
LAW §§ 73, 73-a, 74 (McKinney 2012)). 
 301. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 94 (McKinney 2013). 
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Section 94 and New York’s “Little Hatch Act,” explicitly excludes 
multi-state agencies such as the Port Authority from the ethical and 
political activities regulations set forth by the state.302  Even without 
such explicit language excluding multi-state agencies, such regulations 
would not be applied to bi-state or multi-state employees due to the 
lack of concurrent legislation.303 
Consequently, while state and local employees must look to their 
respective state and municipal laws after HAMA, agencies like the 
Port Authority may implement their own rules.304  Agencies may also 
need to comply with some state regulations.305  For example, several 
states prohibit all employers from taking adverse action against 
employees for engaging in limited protected political activities.306  
However, absent concurrent state regulations, individual agencies are 
left to their own devices, which may be to maintain the status quo 
with strict policies or to enact minimal restrictions and inform 
covered employees of their Hatch Act status.307 
Bi-state and multi-state agencies may have strong incentives to 
avoid public scrutiny, as such scrutiny can influence the agencies’ 
dealings with other organizations or encourage legislation by the 
governing state(s).308  For agencies such as the Port Authority that 
attempt to avoid partisanship, the appearance of impropriety or 
connection to one party or state’s politics could be particularly 
damaging.309  The appearance of partisanship can be particularly 
damaging for agencies operating under a compact requiring 
agreement between member-states because such compacts depend 
upon consensus.310 
																																																																																																																																
 302. Id. 
 303. See King v. Port Authority, 909 F. Supp. 938, 944–45 (D.N.J. 1995); E. 
Paralyzed Veterans Ass’n v. City of Camden, 545 A.2d 127 (N.J. 1988). 
 304. See generally King, 909 F. Supp. 938. 
 305. See HAMA Guidance, supra note 115. 
 306. Eugene Volokh, Private Employees’ Speech And Political Activity: Statutory 
Protection Against Employer Retaliation, 16 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 295 (2012). 
 307. For a comparison of different agency policies, see infra notes 317–19 and 
accompanying text. 
 308. See, e.g., Glenn Blain, State Sen. Brad Hoylman to Introduce Bill to Make 
Port Authority More Transparent, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 10, 2014, http://
www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/legislator-port-authority-transparent-article-
1.1609001. 
 309. Scott A. Coffina, The Perilous Legal Landscape of ‘Bridgegate’, LEGAL 
INTELLIGENCER, January 15, 2014, http://www.thelegalintelligencer.com/
id=1389793430678/The-Perilous-Legal-Landscape-of-
Bridgegate%3Fmcode=0&curindex=0&curpage=1. 
 310. See id.  In light of probes involving the “Bridgegate” scandal, it is particularly 
pertinent to stress such a policy internally and maintain a workforce that functions 
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To compensate for the uncertainty of disparate state regulations, 
some agencies have chosen to implement strict prohibitions on 
political participation by their employees.  The Port Authority is one 
such agency, and its policy is more stringent than those of New York, 
New Jersey, and the Hatch Act.311  Its political activities policy states: 
Given the unique bi-state character of the Port Authority, 
independent of state and local elections, the agency since its 
inception has carried out its responsibilities in a non-partisan 
manner for the public good.  Accordingly, partisan political 
involvement is inappropriate.  Employees must not use their official 
authority or influence to interfere with elections or nominations for 
any federal, state, county, or municipal office or actively work to 
affect their results.  Employees may, however, pursue non-partisan 
candidacies for membership on the board of a public agency or 
institution, such as a Board of Education, provided that their 
department or office head and the Director of Human Resources 
decide that the holding of such local office will not conflict or 
interfere with the discharge of their Port Authority duties.  
In addition, employees may not directly or indirectly induce or 
counsel other employees to make any political contribution and may 
not actively participate personally or in support of partisan political 
campaigns.  There is no intent to interfere with employee rights as 
citizens to vote and express personal views on political subjects and 
																																																																																																																																
“above the fray.”  With heightened internal review and scrutiny from both New York 
and New Jersey, the Port Authority has sufficient reasons to maintain a strict political 
activities policy. 
 311. New York Civil Service Law prohibits state employees from making 
recommendations based on political opinions or affiliations. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW 
§ 107 (McKinney 2007).  It makes prohibitions against compelling those in civil 
service to make political contributions or render political service and protects such 
employees from being removed or prejudiced against for refusing to do so. Id.  
Prohibitions are also made against inquiring about an employee’s affiliations as a test 
of fitness for holding office (making exceptions for inquiry about subversive 
affiliations); using authority or official influence to compel or induce another officer 
or employee to pay a political assessment, subscription or contribution; and using or 
promising to use official authority or influence to influence votes, political action, 
employment, or salary. Id.  New Jersey law prohibits employees in the career or 
senior executive service from, directly or indirectly, using their position to control or 
affect political action of another person or engage in political activity during working 
hours. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 4A:10-1.2(a) (2014).  It goes on to prohibit employees in 
the career, senior executive, or unclassified service whose principal employment is in 
connection with a program financed in whole or in part by federal funds from 
candidacy in partisan elections from using authority to influence votes, and coercing 
the political contribution of a subordinate under the Hatch Act. Id. § 4A:10-1.2(b).  
Presumably, New Jersey’s prohibitions that incorporate the pre-HAMA Hatch Act’s 
wording are ineffective in light of HAMA; however, the failure to update the statute 
post-HAMA further emphasizes the need for states to reexamine their own “Little 
Hatch Acts.” 
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candidates.  Employees may make reasonable voluntary campaign 
contributions to any regularly constituted political or campaign 
organization for its general expenditures.  By “reasonable” is meant 
an amount not so much as to make the employee a prominent 
contributor, identified with either the candidate or the party.312 
The clauses regarding candidacy and active participation in 
partisan political campaigns are particularly notable.313  While the 
allowance of “Hatch Act-covered” state and local government 
employees to run for partisan office is new, the prohibitions against 
state and local employees’ active participation in politics or in support 
of partisan political campaigns were lifted in 1974.314  As state laws do 
not apply to these employees, the agency is free to operate under its 
own, possibly more stringent policy and apply it to all employees 
regardless of their respective Hatch Act coverage.315  Indeed, the Port 
Authority justifies its prohibitions in the first few lines by 
emphasizing the unique “bi-state character” of the Port Authority 
and its operation outside local politics to carry out “its responsibilities 
in a non-partisan manner for the public good.”316 
Not all bi-state and multi-state agencies have opted to enact more 
stringent political activities laws, and many have limits solely on 
political contributions and conflicts of interest.  For instance, the 
Delaware River Port Authority (between New Jersey and 
Pennsylvania) forbids the solicitation or receipt of contributions from 
any other employee on behalf of any candidate and the solicitation or 
acceptance of contributions while on premises.317  The Bi-State 
Development Agency (between Missouri and Illinois) bans the use of 
agency property or money in connection with personal political 
activities and requires that any personal political activity not be done 
in connection to the agency.318  Meanwhile, the Washington 
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (between Virginia, Maryland, 
																																																																																																																																
 312. THE PORT AUTH. OF N.Y. & N.J., supra note 262, at 15–16 (emphasis added). 
 313. Id. 
 314. For a discussion of the 1974 changes, see supra Part I.D. 
 315. See King v. Port Authority, 909 F. Supp. 938, 944–45 (D.N.J. 1995); E. 
Paralyzed Veterans v. City of Camden, 545 A.2d 127 (N.J. 1988). 
 316. See THE PORT AUTH. OF N.Y. & N.J., supra note 262, at 15. 
 317. DEL. RIVER PORT AUTH., BYLAWS OF THE DELAWARE RIVER PORT 
AUTHORITY 19–20 (2014), available at http://www.drpa.org/pdfs/DRPA%20
By%20Laws.pdf. 
 318. BI-STATE DEV. AGENCY D/B/A METRO, METRO CODE OF CONDUCT 5 (2013), 
available at http://www.corporatecompliance.org/Portals/1/PDF/Resources/past_
handouts/CEI/2013/W10_Handout1CodeofConduct.pdf. 
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and the District of Columbia) only forbids conflicts of interest.319  The 
disparity in the extent to which employees at various bi-state and 
multi-state agencies are regulated creates the potential for confusion. 
For agencies not covered by a state “Little Hatch Act,” creating an 
internal political activity policy often means “over-covering” 
employees who do not work in connection with federally funded 
programs.  Agencies, like other employers, have the latitude to adopt 
policies restricting the solicitation of funds or use of company 
computers, resources, or time for political activities.320  For example, 
the Port Authority’s agency-wide policy goes above and beyond what 
is required under both the Hatch Act and the state political activities 
policy.321  In the alternative, agencies may also choose to enact 
policies that are far more lenient, leaving the responsibility to 
individual employees to comply with Hatch Act requirements.  The 
unpredictable enactment of divergent policies reifies confusion over 
the proper application of the Hatch Act, prompting the need for 
further discussion and reform. 
The diversity of Hatch Act approaches raises several questions for 
future research.  First, should bi- and multi-state agencies simply try 
to comply with one state’s rules?  If so, then which states should they 
look to for guidance?  If the agency tries to comply with, for example, 
both New York and New Jersey laws, they may fall into a situation 
where the policies they are implementing are stricter than either 
states’ prohibitions individually.  Similar questions regarding the 
proper scope and application of the Hatch Act’s provisions are also 
raised in discussions over the differences in the Hatch Act’s penalty 
provisions.  As evidenced by both the case law and diverse policies 
implemented by individual agencies, the tenuous relationship 
between bi- and multi-state agencies’ policies and their respective 
states’ “Little Hatch Acts” necessitate a conversation about the 
states’ roles in agency policy formation post-HAMA. 
																																																																																																																																
 319. WASHINGTON METRO. AREA TRANSIT AUTH., COMPACT 4 (2009), available at 
http://wmata.com/about_metro/docs/Compact_Annotated_2009_final.pdf. 
 320. See D. Albert Brannen, Political Speech in the Workplace: Employers 
Beware, TLNT.COM (July 25, 2012), http://www.tlnt.com/2012/07/25/political-speech-
in-the-workplace-employers-beware/. 
 321. Port Authority employees not covered by the Hatch Act are restricted by the 
agency-wide policy. See THE PORT AUTH. OF N.Y. & N.J., supra note 262, at 15–16. 
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C. Rigid Employee Penalty Provisions Produce Undesirable 
Results 
The disparity between remedies for state and federal employees 
under the Hatch Act also produces undesirable results, such as 
unduly strict punishment for minor offenses.322  The penalties for 
federal employees provide more lenient punishment options for 
noncompliance.323  Meanwhile, upon a ruling that they must be 
terminated, state employees must be fired or the agency risks losing 
funding if the employee remains in their employ for the following 
eighteen months.324  If a state employee is found to have committed a 
violation, punishment is limited to termination, whereas federal 
employees may face a thirty-day suspension or $1000 fine.325  The 
federal government does not have the authority to directly impose 
punishments upon state and local employees for their violations; 326 
therefore, as previously mentioned, such employees do not have the 
option of more lenient punishment. 
Concurrent state and federal regulation of political activities 
complicates compliance and increases the likelihood of accidental 
Hatch Act violations.  State and local employees who violate the 
Hatch Act may also run afoul of their own state regulations.327  Since 
the Hatch Act does not preempt state or municipal laws that restrict 
the political activities of state and local employees, such employees 
may have to comply with numerous laws.328  For example, in New 
York City, a city employee whose salary is fully federally funded may 
simultaneously be subject to the Hatch Act, New York City’s 
Conflicts of Interest Law, 329 and New York State’s “Little Hatch 
Act.”330  As such, the employee may be punished under multiple 
provisions and subject to multiple investigations.  A provision 
																																																																																																																																
 322. See supra Part I.G.1–2 (comparing the penalty provisions for state and local 
employees and federal employees). 
 323. See supra Part I.G.1 (discussing the new penalty provisions under HAMA). 
 324. 5 U.S.C. § 1506 (Supp. 2013). 
 325. See 5 U.S.C. § 1215 (Supp. 2013). 
 326. The federal government’s authority to regulate state and local employees is 
limited to its spending power under the Commerce Clause. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, 
cl. 3. 
 327. See HAMA Guidance, supra note 115. 
 328. Sung Mo Kim, Applicability of the Hatch Act to Municipal Officers and 
Employees, N.Y. ST. B.A. MUN. LAW., Fall 2006, at 15, available at http://
www.nyc.gov/html/conflicts/downloads/pdf2/municipal_ethics_laws_ny_state/Applica
bility_of_Hatch_Act_(SKim).pdf. 
 329. N.Y.C. Charter, ch. 68, §§ 2600–2606, available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/
doi/downloads/pdf/chapter68.pdf. 
 330; N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 107 (McKinney 2007). 
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regarding statutory priority or a uniform penalty provision would 
perhaps alleviate some of the confusion connected to coverage by 
multiple provisions. 
D. Criticisms that HAMA Remains Unduly Restrictive on Some 
Law Enforcement Officers 
One of the major arguments for post-HAMA Hatch Act reform 
stems from the disparate impact on law enforcement and emergency 
workers, such as the over 3000 sheriffs331 in the country.  State and 
local law enforcement agencies receive numerous federal grants for 
equipment, new hires, and special programs.332  Before HAMA, the 
receipt of these federal grants prevented many qualified deputies 
from running for sheriff because they fell under the Hatch Act’s 
restriction on those who work in connection with federally funded 
programs.333  While HAMA lifted the candidacy restriction for most 
law enforcement officers, other restrictions under the Hatch Act 
remain, including those prohibiting the public endorsement of 
candidates.334 
The National Sheriffs’ Association (NSA)335 argues that two new 
provisions must be added to the post-HAMA Hatch Act in order for 
recent reforms to be effective.336  First, the NSA argues that a specific 
provision exclusively covering sheriffs is necessary to remedy the 
disparate impact of Section 1502(a)(1) of the Hatch Act, which 
prohibits state or local employees from using “official authority or 
influence for the purpose of interfering with or affecting the result of 
an election or a nomination for office.”337  The NSA proposes a 
provision that would clarify the applicability of the law to allow 
																																																																																																																																
 331. The National Sheriffs’ Association estimates that there were 3083 sheriffs in 
the United States as of January 2012. Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L SHERIFF’S 
ASS’N, http://www.sheriffs.org/content/faq (last visited Feb. 16, 2015). 
 332. See Community Oriented Policing Services: Grants & Funding, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT JUST., http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Default.asp?Item=46#CAMP (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2015). 
 333. See Congress Repeals Restriction on Fire Fighters Running for Political 
Office, supra note 202. 
 334. See Hatch Act Modernization Act of 2012 Fact Sheet, NAT’L SHERIFF’S ASS’N, 
http://www.sheriffs.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/GovAffairs/Hatch%20A
ct%20Legislation%20Fact%20Sheet%2001.09.13.pdf [hereinafter NSA Fact Sheet] 
(last visited Feb. 16, 2015). 
 335. The National Sheriffs’ Association’s criticisms are essential to understanding 
that, despite recent reforms, there remains a disparate impact on many government 
employees. 
 336. NSA Fact Sheet, supra note 334. 
 337. 5 U.S.C. § 1502(a)(1) (Supp. 2013). 
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sheriffs to participate in political activities of other candidates in their 
official capacity and clarify what political activities sheriffs may 
participate in, such as publicly endorsing a candidate or speaking at 
political events and participating in fundraisers.338  The NSA argues 
that Section 1502(a)(1) “is overreaching and ambiguous when applied 
to the Office of Sheriff.”339  As the nature of the sheriff’s office 
requires them to always be on duty and uniformed, they argue, the 
Hatch Act has a disparate impact on this group.340 
The NSA’s second proposal is to impose a statute of limitations to 
file a claim for an alleged violation of the Hatch Act.341  The reasoning 
behind this suggestion is that “individuals have used potential 
violations that occurred in years past by filing a claim with the OSC as 
a political attack against an incumbent sheriff during an election 
cycle.”342  While it is only one example of a group advocating for 
change in the wake of HAMA, the NSA is a representative example 
of the need for reforms.  In fact, reforms have been proposed to 
implement many of the NSA’s proposals.343 
On February 13, 2013, a bill entitled the State and Local Law 
Enforcement Hatch Act Reform Act of 2013 (2013 Reform Act) was 
introduced in the House of Representatives.344  The bill mirrors the 
criticisms of the NSA by proposing that 5 U.S.C. § 1502 be amended 
to add: 
(d) Subsection (a)(1) does not prohibit a sheriff from participating in 
political campaigns for, or endorsing, political candidates running 
for elective office by— 
 (1) attending or speaking at political campaign rallies or events; 
 (2) holding or sponsoring political fundraisers; or 
 (3) appearing on political advertisements, including print, radio, 
television, or any other form of advertising.345 
The bill further purports to add a statute of limitations for law 
enforcement officers by amending Section 1504 to include: 
(b) Statute of Limitations for Law Enforcement Officers.  With 
respect to paragraphs (1) and (3) of section 1502(a), the Special 
																																																																																																																																
 338. NSA Fact Sheet, supra note 334. 
 339. Id. 
 340. Id. 
 341. Id. 
 342. Id. 
 343. See, e.g., H.R. 659, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 344. Id. 
 345. Id. 
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Counsel may not present any charges against a law enforcement 
officer under subsection (a) after the end of the 6-month period 
beginning on the later of— 
 (1) the date of the alleged violation of paragraph (1) or (3) of 
section 1502(a), as the case may be; or 
 (2) the date of the enactment of the State and Local Law 
Enforcement Hatch Act Reform Act of 2013.346 
The bill was referred to the House Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform on February 13, 2013; however, no progress has 
been made since.347 
By examining the disparate state regulations and their impact on 
bi- and multi-state agencies, the implications of HAMA’s 
liberalization of its state and local provisions come to light.  Without 
one overarching regulation, confusion over coverage can lead to a 
chilling effect.  Another example of such confusion occurs with 
overlapping prohibitions, as seen in the discussion of the UCMJ and 
DODD.  Additionally, certain undesirable relics from the pre-
HAMA Hatch Act remain: the rigid penalty provisions for state and 
local employees and provisions disparately impacting law 
enforcement officers including a provision barring the public 
endorsement of candidates.  This Part has discussed the criticisms and 
suggestions of law enforcement groups, including the NSA, to provide 
background for workable solutions. 
III.  ELIMINATING CONFUSION AND UNIFYING DISPARATE 
PROHIBITIONS TO FOSTER HEALTHY POLITICAL DISCOURSE 
Although there is no single simple solution to the problems created 
by the post-HAMA Hatch Act, a combination of minor statutory 
amendments could help alleviate some of the widespread confusion 
regarding the Hatch Act’s updated scope and requirements.  
Policymakers drafting such statutory reforms must consider the Hatch 
Act within the context of the relatively recent and diverse state 
regulations that it brought about.  Since most of the harms caused by 
the Hatch Act’s current application stem from confusion over 
coverage, any successful proposal must successfully clarify the Hatch 
Act’s scope.  Possible options for such proposals include new state 
promulgated guidelines, a statutory exemption for lower level 
																																																																																																																																
 346. Id. 
 347. H.R. 659 (113th): State and Local Law Enforcement Hatch Act Reform Act 
of 2013, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr659 (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2015). 
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government employees, discretionary penalty provisions, and the 
addition of a statute of limitation for claims brought pursuant to the 
Hatch Act’s existing provisions.  These changes would clarify the 
Hatch Act’s scope and prevent abusive use of the Hatch Act’s 
punitive provisions during contested campaigns. 
A. States Must Provide Guidance to Overcome Wide Disparities 
in Hatch Act Enforcement 
One potential way to overcome the confusion generated by the 
disparate enforcement of the Hatch Act and “Little Hatch Acts” 
would be on the state level.  Individual states should provide 
independent, bi- and multi-state, and local agencies with guidelines 
for crafting their own political activities policies to compensate for 
disparities in the application of the Hatch Act and “Little Hatch 
Acts.”  Promulgation of guidelines by the state would be the most 
efficient way to assimilate state and federal Hatch Act interpretations 
for use by agencies in crafting their policies.  As the state becomes the 
primary regulator of state and local employees, it assumes the 
responsibilities of informing its employees of which activities will put 
the employee at risk and which employees are further regulated. 
The states should provide clarity for agencies by issuing guidelines 
that agencies could use when crafting their employment policies.  The 
states have the best mechanism for facilitating predictable standards 
after HAMA.  States should clarify who is covered, when they are 
covered, what kind of activity is covered, and what the penalties are.  
State governments are in a position of authority to which state 
agencies will look to regulate the political activities of their 
employees.  Such action could also provide an opportunity for state 
legislatures to evaluate whether their current statutory prohibitions 
reflect the recent changes effectuated by HAMA.  It is unlikely that 
they have reevaluated their “Little Hatch Acts” in the interim. 
Individual agencies with their own political activities policies may 
also wish to use the state law as a baseline, if not the guidelines 
themselves.  This is particularly true for bi- and multi-state agencies.  
In such cases, the participant states should convene with the agencies 
to craft policies to comply with both or all states’ regulations.  States 
could help by specifying whether all agencies must comply with their 
rule or whether agencies are free to have more stringent guidelines.  
Creating a uniform baseline avoids the vast disparities that may result 
from agencies crafting their own policies. 
A baseline state policy for agencies would decrease confusion at 
the agency level.  For employees of individual agencies, it would 
832 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLII 
decrease questions regarding coverage and limitations.  For bi- and 
multi-state agencies, convening between the states may still result in 
discrepancies between the state and agency policies, as some 
individual states may be stricter than others.348  However, without 
state guidelines, it is likely that agencies will craft the most 
conservatively worded political activities policy possible to avoid 
running afoul of state policy.  As mentioned, concurrent legislation is 
needed for a law to apply to a bi- or multi-state agency.349  If the states 
can agree on the provisions, concurrent legislation may be a simpler 
solution.  Overall, the passage of HAMA should be the catalyst for 
states to examine their current policies and issue guidelines to the 
agencies under their purview. 
B. Exempting all Lower-Level Employees from the Hatch Act’s 
Prohibitions 
In addition to a state-level solution, another solution to the 
disparate impact of the current Hatch Act provisions would be to 
exempt lower-level employees at the federal, state, and local levels.  
Removing state and local employees completely from the Hatch Act’s 
coverage would prevent any confusion between the federal Hatch Act 
and “Little Hatch Acts.”  However, a more effective provision for 
maintaining the original legislative intent of the Hatch Act would be a 
provision exempting all lower-level or ministerial employees at the 
state and federal levels.  Exempting lower-level employees would also 
remove the unintended effects of chilling the speech and political 
participation of myriad employees.  Therefore, it is necessary to 
implement a rule that changes the essence of the regulation to 
whether or not the employee is in a supervisory or policy-related 
position.  Federal employees are already separated into more and less 
restricted categories; accordingly, it would not be unreasonable to 
further divide employees by civil service grade. 
Exempting all lower-level employees from the Hatch Act’s 
provisions would address employees categorically by their 
responsibilities and the likelihood that their political activity would 
evoke impropriety and coercion.  This provision would have a 
broader effect than exempting all state and local employees by 
applying to both state and federal employees.  Lower-level employees 
are less likely to raise the appearance of impropriety by running for 
																																																																																																																																
 348. See generally Gely & Chandler, supra note 211, at 791–96. 
 349. See King v. Port Authority, 909 F. Supp. 938, 944–45 (D.N.J. 1995); E. 
Paralyzed Veterans v. City of Camden, 545 A.2d 127 (N.J. 1988). 
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office, but more likely to be coerced by their policy-making 
superiors.350  One potential solution would be to protect clerical 
workers from coercion through political activity rules that apply to 
their supervisors only, and prevent policy workers from running for 
public office.  However, it must be noted that this change may only be 
nominal, as most of the remaining provisions of the Hatch Act 
overlap with state political activities laws.351  Therefore, the solution 
to the current policy of over-regulating lower-level employees may 
ultimately lie with the states. 
In order to most effectively exempt lower-level employees, mirror-
image provisions to the proposed federal laws exempting lower-level 
employees should also be passed in the states.  Many state regulations 
already take into account whether an employee is a clerical employee 
or a policy employee based on civil service grade.352  While the Hatch 
Act further regulates particular agencies involved in law enforcement 
and other sensitive areas,353 the interest of the Hatch Act can be 
furthered by altering prohibitions against political activity to apply to 
those with hiring and firing abilities or in supervisory positions.  
Preventing lower-level employees from campaigning or displaying 
support for a candidate does not further the interest of avoiding 
coercion.  Additionally, policy-making employees are more likely to 
incite the patronage provisions of the Hatch Act, as they have 
inherent conflicts of interest,354 which could affect the integrity of an 
election.  Meanwhile, workers who do not work in policy-making 
positions but rather in clerical or law enforcement positions may wish 
to run for partisan local elections.  For instance, in holding that the 
Oklahoma legislature had the latitude to restrict certain employees’ 
partisan political activities and not others, the Court in Broadrick 
empowered state legislatures to make their own determinations when 
covering state employees under “Little Hatch Acts.”355  As such, state 
legislatures can and should regulate different types of state employees 
based on whether their work deals with policy or clerical work.  It is 
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time to return to the model of protecting employees from coercion 
and to move away from excessive policing of otherwise unobtrusive 
activities. 
Since the Hatch Act’s inclusion of state and local employees in 
1940, Congress took steps through both the FECA Amendments and 
HAMA towards removing many of the prohibitions imposed on such 
employees.356  While HAMA effectively eliminated the prohibition 
against running for partisan office for most state and local employees, 
the Hatch Act’s other provisions, such as those covering the use of 
official authority or influence to affect the results of an election or 
solicitation of funds for political purposes, currently cover all state 
and local employees who work in connection with federal funds.357  As 
many states already prohibit these activities, the next logical step is to 
eliminate state and local employees from the Hatch Act altogether 
and leave their regulation to the states.358  Now that the prohibition 
against running for partisan office for most Hatch Act-covered state 
employees has been lifted, perhaps the position of the Hatch Act in 
the lives of state and local employees has reached a turning point.  As 
the majority of the remaining prohibitions overlap with state political 
activities policies, HAMA may have been just one more step in a 
fifty-year history of phasing state and local employees out of federal 
regulation. 
C. Adding a Discretionary Penalty Provision 
On the federal level, the Hatch Act should be amended to include 
a discretionary penalty provision for state and local employees and to 
encourage discourse between the state and federal governments 
regarding penalties.  The penalty provisions under HAMA do not 
account for the possibility of various degrees of offenses for state and 
local employees, even though the Act does so for federal 
employees.359  One solution could be to create a mirror image of the 
federal penalties for state employees.360  Although the federal 
government cannot enforce penalties directly against state and local 
government employees for Hatch Act violations, it may suggest that a 
state adopt a modified penalty structure.  Alternatively, the federal 
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government may amend its own penalty provisions to account for 
more minor offenses by state and local employees. 
The federal government and state legislatures should additionally 
engage in communication regarding enforcement of penalty 
provisions for violations of the Hatch Act and “Little Hatch Acts.”  
For example, when an employee violates both the Hatch Act and a 
“Little Hatch Act,” states should have a clear statute where only one 
of the potential penalties would be enforced.  Further, the federal 
government should alter its current penalty provision for state and 
local employees by replacing the current policy with a modified fee 
structure proportional to the offense, with fines capped at two times 
the employee’s annual salary at the time of the violation.361 
By addressing the issue of the disparate impact of the penalty 
provisions on state and local employees and agencies, these proposals 
would address one of the more problematic areas under the Hatch 
Act that remains untouched by HAMA.  In altering the penalty 
provisions for federal employees, HAMA neglected to reconsider the 
penalty imposed on any other federally funded agency hiring the 
terminated employee within eighteen months of their violation.362  
This provision effectively blacklists public employees for any finding 
by the MSPB that a violation exists.  This may be reduced by the 
implementation of a modified penalty structure, which would only 
impose the penalty on other agencies in the most serious of cases.  
Even if the current penalty provision is not modified, the provision 
deterring other agencies from hiring employees terminated for 
violations of the Hatch Act should nonetheless be modified.  One way 
to implement this change would be to impose a lower penalty for the 
hiring agency’s more minor violations or abbreviating the eighteen-
month bar on hiring to three to six months.  These changes would 
address the serious disparity in the treatment of state and local 
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employees and the gap in the revisions to the federal penalty 
provisions made by HAMA. 
D. Adding a Statute of Limitations 
Lastly, the federal Hatch Act must be amended to include a statute 
of limitations to encourage efficient and timely enforcement and 
prevent abuse.  The passage of the 2013 Reform Act, which seeks to 
reduce the restrictions on political activity for law enforcement 
officers and impose a statute of limitations for reporting violations 
made by law enforcement officers, would improve on the current 
provisions.363  While the 2013 Reform Act proposed a statute of 
limitations applicable to law enforcement officers, a global statute of 
limitations is necessary to prevent abuse of the Hatch Act and 
promote prompt reporting of violations.364  However, the proposed 
statute of limitations is rather short (six months) and limited in 
scope.365  A more practical solution would be to impose a one-year 
statute of limitations on the entire Hatch Act.  This would discourage 
abuse of the provisions for political gain and allow sufficient time for 
incidents to come to light.  Additionally, a global statute of limitations 
would decrease confusion and lend uniformity to the law because it 
would be applicable to all “Hatch Act-covered” employees. 
Critics of the post-HAMA Hatch Act have proposed a statute of 
limitations.366  In addition to the proposals raised by the NSA, Ward 
Morrow, Assistant General Counsel for the American Federation of 
Government Employees, argues that “[t]he biggest flaw of the Hatch 
Act [is that] there is no statute of limitations.  The fact that there isn’t 
one means [the OSC] can go back to the [Andrew] Johnson 
administration . . . to look for violations.  At some point, people need 
to move on and close the books.”367  Without a statute of limitations, 
there is a risk of abuse of process; for instance, those seeking to 
discredit a candidate or retaliate against a fellow employee could dig 
up potential past violations, or fail to report known violations until an 
advantageous time.368  Statutes of limitations also serve the valid 
purpose of promoting the prompt reporting of incidents.369 
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A statute of limitations provision in the Hatch Act would reduce 
confusion and produce predictability in the enforcement of the law.  
Without a statute of limitations, one might be uncertain about 
whether an action is considered a violation if a substantial period of 
time has passed since the incident.  A statute of limitations would also 
reduce the occurrence of claims filed for the purposes of political 
attacks for all employees and encourage prompt reporting of 
incidents to the OSC.370  Prompt reporting would also help in 
substantiating claims, as the general purpose of a statute of limitations 
is to aid in gathering such evidentiary support.371  Memories may fade, 
employees who witness a violation may leave or retire, and e-mails or 
materials may be lost if the violation is not brought up for a 
significant period of time.372  With a statute of limitations in place, the 
Hatch Act would become a more effective mechanism to protect our 
civil service system from corruption. 
E. Taking Realistic Steps Toward the Realization of Greater 
Predictability and Enforcement of the Hatch Act 
While the aforementioned proposals would begin to effectively 
address the harms of the post-HAMA Hatch Act, they would not be 
easy to actually pass into law.  Wholesale change may not pass as a 
single law so soon after HAMA; however, a law addressing the more 
pressing and practical issues of a statute of limitations, in conjunction 
with State actions clarifying “Little Hatch Acts” and rules for bi- and 
multi-state agencies would be both realistic and manageable.  The 
aforementioned 2013 Reform Act could improve the current 
provisions of the Hatch Act.373  This bill was introduced in the House 
and referred to the House Oversight and Government Reform 
Committee on February 13, 2013.374  The bill has sat in committee and 
there has been no activity regarding the bill since.375  While this bill 
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only applies to law enforcement officers, it is a step in the right 
direction.  The passage of laws with narrower scope may be the push 
needed to eventually implement change on a larger scale.376  If the 
2013 Reform Act were to pass, it would implement crucial provisions 
such as a statute of limitations and lifting the ban on campaigning for 
state and local law enforcement officers, who remain the most 
vulnerable to being covered under the Hatch Act’s provisions after 
HAMA.  
CONCLUSION 
HAMA is an important turning point in the regulation of 
government employees and their political participation.  Exempting 
many state and local employees from the Hatch Act’s prohibitions is 
an important recognition of the value of political discourse and the 
ability of the states to enact policies that best mitigate the coercion 
and deceptive political practices.  While the federal government 
cannot force the states to adopt any particular regulation in the wake 
of HAMA, states should recognize the necessity to reevaluate their 
current policies.  States should enforce policies that are either 
consistent and predictable, or at least flexible enough to avoid 
unnecessary confusion and agency costs. 
Realistic changes to the Hatch Act and its progeny can be made on 
two levels: federal and state.  The highest priority for amendments to 
the Hatch Act should be given to modifying the penalty provisions for 
state and local employees and a statute of limitations.  Through the 
implementation of a statute of limitations and a discretionary penalty 
provision on the federal level, there would be greater predictability of 
enforcement and the proportionality of punishments given to federal 
employees through HAMA will benefit state and local employees as 
well.  Then, states should consider the compatibility of their current 
“Little Hatch Acts” with the post-HAMA Hatch Act and individual 
agency policies.  In doing so, they should consider the effects on bi- 
and multi-state agencies and consult with other states in multi-state 
compacts.  The history of statutory amendments and pressure for 
reform of the Hatch Act illustrate a great appreciation for free 
speech.  However, now is not the time to appreciate the effects of 
HAMA, but to bring the principles of HAMA to fruition without 
sacrificing the accountability of public employees who participate in 
politics.  The manageable changes suggested in this Note would 
ameliorate the most pressing implementation and enforcement issues 
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post-HAMA and lead to a more sustainable policy for the regulation 
of political activities for public employees. 
